REVISED REICHMAN FINAL 3-9-09

3/9/2009 2:26 PM

THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL HONORABLE
HELEN WILSON NIES MEMORIAL
LECTURE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL
TRIAL DATA IN INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE
CASE FOR A PUBLIC GOODS APPROACH
JEROME H. REICHMAN*
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 3
I.
EXPORTING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA EXCLUSIVITY REGIMES
FROM DEVELOPED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES .......................... 9
A. The Egregiously High Costs and Risks of Clinical Trials .......... 9
B. The Domestic Response .............................................................. 11
C. The Drive for Global Protection of Clinical Trial Data .......... 14
1. From NAFTA (1992) to TRIPS (1994) .............................. 15
a. The NAFTA Provisions.................................................. 15
b. The Softer TRIPS Provisions ......................................... 17
2. The Posterior Free Trade Agreements ............................... 22
a. Expanding Protection for Clinical Trial Data in
Developing Countries...................................................... 23
b. Recent Constraints on USTR’s Negotiating
Mandate ............................................................................ 28
D. A Missed Opportunity: The Cost-Sharing Alternative ............. 29
* Bunyan S. Womble Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
An early version of this Article was presented at the Eleventh Annual Honorable Helen
Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture, Marquette University School of Law, March 26, 2008. I wish
to thank Professors Tracy Lewis and Anthony So for their collaboration on the final part of
this article; James Boyle, Irene Calboli, Kali Murray, and Bruce Boyden for their advice and
encouragement; Dennis O’Connor (Duke Law 2L) for outstanding research assistance; and
Patricia Reichman for indefatigable editorial support. I also gratefully acknowledge the
support of the National Human Genome Research Institute and the Department of Energy
(5P50H-G003391-02).
© 2009 Jerome H. Reichman

REVISED REICHMAN FINAL 3-9-09

2 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

3/9/2009 2:26 PM

[Vol. 13:1

1. An Early U.S. Proposal Envisioned a Liability Rule ........ 30
2. Implementing a Compensatory Liability Regime ............. 32
II.
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA
REGIMES .............................................................................................. 36
A. The Flawed Logic of Marketing Exclusivity ............................. 36
1. Evaluating the Incentive Rationale ..................................... 36
2. Why a Sui Generis Exclusive Property Right? ................... 42
B. From Private to Public Goods: The Most Logical Reform ..... 48
1. Public Disclosure: Only the First Step in a Broader
Reform .................................................................................... 49
2. The Case for Treating Clinical Trials as a Public
Good ....................................................................................... 51
a. The Drug Companies’ Costs Would Decline with
Government Funding of Clinical Trials ........................ 52
b. Lower Drug Company Costs Would Benefit
Consumers in the Short Run........................................... 53
c. Long Run Efficiencies in Drug Discovery and
Development .................................................................... 54
(1) Stimulating More Investment in Innovative
R&D with Lower Costs and Better
Information ............................................................... 55
(2) A Secondary Market for Remedial Improvers ..... 57
3. Implementing a Public Testing Program ............................ 58
a. Awarding Clinical Tests to the Most Qualified
Scientists ........................................................................... 58
b. Revenue Neutral Financing with Cost Sharing and
Social Funding Criteria ................................................... 58
c. Phased Implementation .................................................. 60
d. Globalization of the Public Good Concept .................. 61
CONCLUSION.................................................................................................. 65

REVISED REICHMAN FINAL 3-9-09

2009]

3/9/2009 2:26 PM

RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA

3

INTRODUCTION
News about clinical trial data is constantly before our eyes lately,
and little of it is good. Again and again we learn that some major drug
1
has produced deleterious side effects. Internal memos emerge showing
that the pharmaceutical companies knew or should have known about
negative results from the clinical data, but that they overlooked or
2
deliberately suppressed them. In the recent case of Zetia, for example,
the manufacturers reportedly ignored test results indicating that the
cholesterol-lowering drug combination of Zetia and Zocor was
3
ineffective and potentially dangerous as well.
On reflection, one might begin to ask why this trend seems so
surprising. Clinical trials cost vast sums of money, and, as will be shown
later, these costs are rising so fast that they may become unsustainable
1. See, e.g., Bruce M. Psaty & Richard A. Kronmal, Reporting Mortality Findings in
Trials of Rofecoxib for Alzheimer Disease or Cognitive Impairment: A Case Study Based on
Documents From Rofecoxib Litigation, 299(15) J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1813 (2008); Peter
Benesh, Second Guessing Continues For Merck, Schering; Vytorin Mess Won’t Let Up;
Experts wonder why the pharma giants can’t leave well enough alone, INVESTORS BUS.
DAILY, Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://www.investors.com; Rep Henry A. Waxman Holds a
Hearing on FDA’s Drug and Device State Lawsuit Pre-emption, CONG. Q. TRANSCRIPTIONS
(May 14, 2008); Rep. Rick Boucher Holds a Hearing on Drug Safety, CONG. Q.
TRANSCRIPTIONS (Feb. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Boucher Hearing].
2. See, e.g., Boucher Hearing, supra note 1,
Within the first three years of PDUFA, seven drugs, resulting in more than 1,000
deaths, had been removed. Those seven deadly drugs, rushed for approval under
PDUFA, were not needed to save lives. . . . Today we will hear . . . how Ketek was
approved by the FDA, even though the FDA knew the large safety study it required
was fraught with data irregularities. Ketek is prescribed for non-life-threatening
illnesses, but the rush to approve has resulted in . . . approximately 10 deaths related
to Ketek’s use.
Id.; Psaty & Kronmal, supra note 1, [regarding Merck’s rofecoxib]:
[I]n April 2001, the company’s internal intention-to-treat analyses of pooled data
from these 2 trials identified a significant increase in total mortality . . . 34 deaths
among 1069 rofecoxib patients and 12 deaths among 1078 placebo patients. . . . The
data submitted by the sponsor to the FDA . . . in July 2001 used on-treatment
analysis methods and reported 29 deaths (2.7%) among 1067 rofecoxib patients and
17 deaths (1.6%) among 1075 placebo patients. This on-treatment approach to
reporting minimized the appearance of any mortality risk.
Id. at 1813.
3. The partners in the Vytorin venture . . . went to market in 2004 with a drug that
combined Schering’s Zetia with Zocor, a Merck drug whose patent expired in 2006. . . . [O]n
Jan. 14 [they] released the results of a two-year clinical trial that had ended in 2006. . . . [T]he
trial found that while Vytorin did push down cholesterol, it did so with no health benefit to
patients. Worse, it created a potentially hazardous side effect. Instead of clearing plaque
from artery walls, Vytorin appears to have led to, or at least allowed, a thickening of that
plaque.
Benesh, supra note 1.
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over time. A negative outcome will sink an entire research project,
which, from the lab to the trial, may entail a loss of hundreds of millions
5
of dollars. The costs of such failures must then be made up from the few
products that do succeed, which, according to some estimates, means
that the aggregate breakeven costs of clinical trials for any successful
6
new chemical entity may reach one billion dollars. So one may suspect
that there is a moral hazard here because if the pharmaceutical
companies pay for the tests, they have a perverse incentive to paint the
7
end results in the rosiest possible light.
The pharmaceutical companies have also lobbied successfully for
regulatory relief from the burden of recouping the cumulative costs of
clinical trial data in the form of a backdoor intellectual property right
8
known in the United States as “marketing exclusivity” and in the
9
European Union as “data exclusivity.” By these means, originator
pharmaceutical companies obtain a period of time, ranging from three
to ten years, during which would-be generic producers of existing drugs
cannot themselves obtain regulatory approval for a competing drug if
they rely—directly or indirectly—on the results of the originator’s own
undisclosed test data, which will have been provided to governments

4. See infra text accompanying notes 34-43.
5. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 151-85 (2003).
6. Id.
7. Jerry Avorn, Dangerous Deception—Hiding the Evidence of Adverse Drug Effects,
355(21) NEW ENG. J. MED. 2169, 2169-70 (2006).
[Anent aprotinin’s] manufacturer, Bayer, had hired a private contract research
organization to perform its own large observational study of postoperative
complications in patients given the drug. The analysis, completed in time for the
FDA meeting, reached conclusions similar to those of Mangano et al. [which were
negative]. . . . [P]atients who received aprotinin had higher mortality rates and
substantially more renal damage than those given other treatments. But neither
Bayer nor its contractor had provided the report to the FDA or even acknowledged
its existence before the meeting. . . . A few years ago, it was discovered that some
companies had funded multiple clinical trials of their selective serotonin-reuptake
inhibitor antidepressants but reported the results of only the favorable trials—
distorting the evidence base physicians use in choosing drugs.
Id. One report found 90 percent of firm sponsored trials produced results favorable to the
sponsoring firm. Stephan Heres et al., Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, Risperidone Beats
Quetiapine, and Quetiapine Beats Olanzapine: An Exploratory Analysis of Head-to-Head
Comparison Studies of Second-Generation Antipsychotics, 163:2 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 185
(2006).
8. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)
9. Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European
Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 502 (2004).
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under strict conditions of trade secrecy.
Of course, the would-be competitor could not market a generic drug
anyway until the originator’s patent had expired, and the former would
in principle remain free to conduct its own clinical trials. But the costbenefit ratio makes the latter option illusory in practice, because—apart
from the loss of time—the generic competitor, who by definition lacks a
patent, could not readily charge consumers enough to recoup the
11
enormous costs of such trials. Moreover, repeating a pre-existing trial
for such a reason raises ethical questions, because it would deny some
patients access to medicines known to be effective purely for
12
commercial purposes.
Because the generic competitor must rely
indirectly on the originator’s successful clinical test outcomes by
showing that its generic product is the bioequivalent of an approved
13
product, and therefore exempt from the need for further testing, a
period of data exclusivity potentially becomes a means of keeping the
generic producer off the market regardless of the status of that
14
originator’s own patent.
In other words, even if the originator’s patent had expired, or was
otherwise invalidated, the data exclusivity regime may provide a de
facto alternative exclusive right by blocking the competitor’s entry into
15
the market for as long as the period of such protection lasts. Data
exclusivity regimes have thus become “increasingly dominant as an
16
additional intellectual property layer of protection,” which blocks
generic competition even with respect to second indications and other

10. See, e.g., Junod, supra note 9, at 490; Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property Data
Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 97-132 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH].
11. See, e.g., Karin Timmermans, Monopolizing Clinical Trial Data: Implications and
Trends, 4 PLOS MED. 206 (2007).
12. Id. However, generic trials might also provide drugs to patients who otherwise
could not afford them.
13. See, e.g., Junod, supra note 9, at 490 (“Marketing exclusivity precludes a second
applicant from relying on the data previously provided to demonstrate the safety and efficacy
of the reference drug.”); id. at 506 (European Union interprets reliance as in United States,
namely, it “refers to reliance by the drug agency, and not to direct access and use of the data
by the second applicant”). See also Timmermans, supra note 11, at 206 (questioning broad
notion of “reliance” given that generic producers must submit their own data on quality in
addition to showing chemical and biological equivalence to the original, without ever
obtaining access to the originator’s data).
14. See, e.g., Junod, supra note 9, at 480; infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
15. Timmermans, supra note 11, at 206, 208.
16. Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 10, at 117.
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variations that are “not innovative enough to gain patent protection.”
The lay observer might well express surprise to learn how deeply
rooted these alternative sui generis data exclusivity regimes have
become in both the United States and the European Union. After all, a
consumer advocate might object, originator companies had been given a
18
twenty-year patent monopoly for just this purpose.
The relative
strength of patents in the pharmaceutical sector is often justified by the
need for consumers to cover the “risk premium,” that is, the losses
accruing from failed pharmaceutical research projects, especially failed
clinical trials, over and above the specific Research and Development
19
(“R&D”) costs associated with any given successful drug.
Later in this Article, I will critically examine the various rationales,
and particularly the incentive rationale, that supporters of these regimes
20
have put forward over time.
Suffice it to say, the pharmaceutical
industry has quietly but successfully pursued this alternative intellectual
property right in the results of clinical trials, independent of and
cumulative with the patent rights that everyone takes for granted.
Besides entrenching and expanding these regimes in the domestic laws
21
22
of the United States
and the European Union,
industry
17. Junod, supra note 9, at 480 (quoting Greg Perry, Director General of the European
Generic Medicines Assoc.).
18. Additionally, there are possible extensions for delays in approval, under 35
U.S.C.S. § 156. Suzan Kucukarslan & Jacqueline Cole, Patent Extension Under the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511
(1994).
19. See, e.g., Laba Karki, Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The HatchWaxman Act, Regulatory Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, 87 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 602, 602 (2005) (“[P]harmaceutical companies depend
upon these intellectual property protections not only to spur investment in research and
development of new drugs, but also to recuperate the cost of bringing the patented drug into
market, including the cost of hundreds of pro-drugs that typically die during the clinical trial
phases.”). See also Henry Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases:
Lessons from the Orphan Drug Act, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 457-80 (Keith
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter Grabowski, Increasing R&D
Incentives]; Michael Enzo Furrow, Analyzing The Laws, Regulations, and Policies Affecting
FDA-Regulated Products: Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v.
Teleflex, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 275 (2008) (“The recent decision by the Supreme Court in
KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. poses a threat to the present balance, and pharmaceutical
innovators in particular are at risk of losing some of the essential patent protections that
allow them to recoup their drug discovery and development investment.”).
20. See, e.g., G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other
Data Required by Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS 1 (2003);
infra text accompanying notes 157-88.
21. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 P.L. 417
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representatives have mounted a campaign to establish similar regimes at
23
the multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels. After a regional success
in the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), this drive
scored only a more modest victory in the Agreement on Trade-Related
24
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (“TRIPS”). When
efforts to improve on the TRIPS compromise failed, the U.S. Trade
Representative (“USTR”) began pressing other governments with
demands for more far-reaching codified enactments of this form of
protection for clinical trial results in the course of regional and bilateral
25
Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”).
Restrictions on the use of clinical data under FTAs can effectively
empower originator pharmaceutical companies to negate a foreign
state’s ability to authorize marketing approval of equivalent generic
drugs for a period of five to fifteen years, even when these companies
26
could not invoke patents to prevent the use of the drugs as such. If
developing countries reject clauses seeking to establish these alternative
forms of protection for clinical trial results, they may forfeit
advantageous trade concessions, especially in negotiations with the
United States and possibly in trade negotiations with the European
Union. Few governments have been willing to run this risk.
27
On the contrary, with each new success, the pharmaceutical

(Sept. 24, 1984); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(c)(3)(D), 355 (j)(5), reprinted in 21 C.F.R. § 314.108
(1993).
22. Council Directive 2001/83, 2001 O.J. (L 311) 67 (EC), replacing Council Directive
87/21, 1987 O.J. (L 015) 36 (EC).
23. See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, The “Good Old Days” of TRIPS: The U.S. Trade Agenda
and the Extension of Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 341 (2004); Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed
Clinical Trial Data:
From Private to Public Good?, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 135-39 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds.,
2006); Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products
under Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 81-96 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Correa,
NEGOTIATING HEALTH].
24. See infra text accompanying notes 66-84.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 96-120.
26. See infra notes 108-13.
27. For a review of the main IP-related elements of FTAs with Vietnam, Jordan,
Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, DR-CAFTA, and Bahrain with a focus on how they
exceed TRIPS, see Carsten Fink & Patrick Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual
Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade Agreements, The World Bank Group, Trade
Note 20, Feb. 7, 2005, available at http://worldbank.org/trade. For Latin America, see David
Vivas-Eugui, Regional and bilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus world: The Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) (QUNO, Geneva, QIAP, Ottawa, ICTSD, Geneva 2003).
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companies’ demands have become more audacious, to the point where
some of the pending FTAs with Latin American countries—for
example, Colombia and Peru—seemed so to exceed limits of
reasonableness, that they elicited some restraining intervention from
28
Congress. Meanwhile, the proliferation of data exclusivity provisions
in FTAs, with their Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) repercussions under
29
Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement, establishes facts on the ground that
30
have growing implications for the future. If nothing intervenes, this
powerful new intellectual property regime will become an ever more
31
likely candidate for permanent recognition at the multilateral level.
This Article will track these developments and critically examine
their deeper implications. Part I surveys the soaring costs of clinical
trials in developed countries, a phenomenon that must be kept in mind
when assessing the protectionist pressures brought to bear at the
international level. Following a brief summary of the domestic
responses to this and related problems in the United States and
European Union, this part will describe and analyze the specific efforts
that have been made to establish data exclusivity in multilateral,
regional, and bilateral agreements.
Part II evaluates this trend as a whole. It first asks what legal and
economic logic justifies this form of intellectual property protection. To
the extent that an incentive rationale can be mustered to justify a sui
generis regime of clinical data exclusivity at all, it questions the validity
of adopting a patent-like regime to support mere investment as such,
28. Recent Agreement ‘Big Setback’ for Rx Companies, American Health Line, May 18,
2007.
A recent agreement between the Bush administration and Congress on a new policy
for trade agreements with Columbia, Panama and Peru includes provisions that
would increase the use of generic medications in those nations and “marks the first
big setback for the pharmaceutical industry since Democrats claimed Capitol Hill,”
the Wall Street Journal reports. The new policy would eliminate “linkage,” which
requires trade partners to ensure generic medications do not violate any patents
before they allow such treatments to reach the market.
Id. See infra text accompanying notes 121-25.
29. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 4,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments— Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
30. See, e.g., Timmermans, supra note 11; Antony Taubman, Unfair Competition and
the Financing of Public Knowledge Goods: The Problem of Test Data Protection, 3 J. INTELL.
PROP. & PRACTICE 591, 603 (2008).
31. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 71.1 (“[T]he [TRIPS] Council may also
undertake reviews in the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant
modification or amendment of this Agreement.”).
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without obtaining any given level of creative achievement in return.
The final segment of Part II will contend that the technical debate
surrounding the treatment of clinical data as a subcategory of
intellectual property law masks a much deeper problem. Here, I argue
that the real conceptual flaw at the core of this anomalous regime is the
uncritical practice of treating clinical trials as a private rather than a
public good. I then re-elaborate the case for government oversight and
32
government funding of clinical trials and attempt to show the
advantages that would arise from treating clinical trials of new
pharmaceutical products as a global public good. The Conclusion
summarizes the enquiry and sets out core findings and
recommendations.
I.

EXPORTING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA EXCLUSIVITY REGIMES FROM
DEVELOPED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

We will see in Part II that different justifications for sui generis
protection of clinical test data have been put forward at different times
33
with varying degrees of persuasiveness. What remains constant behind
the changing rhetoric is the fact that the costs of clinical trials are high,
growing higher, and have lately become potentially unsustainable.
A. The Egregiously High Costs and Risks of Clinical Trials
Recent studies claim that the cost of clinical trials in the United
States accounts for a disproportionately large share of the overall cost of
bringing new drugs to market and now reaches $800 million to $1 billion
34
per approved drug. While the accuracy of this figure may be disputed
35
at the margins, it necessarily includes the cumulatively high costs of
32. Tracy R. Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman, & Anthony D. So, The Case for Public
Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (Jan. 2007), available at
http://www.bepress.com/ev [hereinafter Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding].
33. See infra Part II.
34. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 166. The cost of clinical trials is only 70% of the total
figure of $802 million that they estimate. Cost-of-capital inflates the cost of pre-clinical
research significantly. Id. at 164.
35. Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating The Cost Of New Drug
Development: Is It Really $ 802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006) (“[F]or one large
pharmaceutical firm, the expected cost of developing a drug is $521 million, while for another
large firm, it is $2,119 million.”). Moreover, the figures for the nonprofit sector appear to be
much lower. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 75-76 (2006) (“[T]he estimates for
public–private partnership products tend to be much lower. . . . [T]he final cost of clinical
trials is estimated at between US$ 76 and US$ 115 million . . . [with] a total per-drug R&D
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clinical trials incurred for the many drugs that fail to win approval.
Year after year, the costs of conducting clinical trials reportedly
37
outstrip the medical component of the consumer price index.
Similarly, between 1977 and 1995, the burden of data production
increased by 43% in mean number of pages per new drug application
38
(“NDA”), by 37% in mean number of patients per NDA, and by 44%
39
in mean number of clinical trials per NDA.
Other things being equal, there has been an increase of more than

cost of between US$ 115 and US$ 240 million.”).
36. DiMasi et al., supra note 5; Adams & Brantner, supra note 35.
37. See Lori Shields, Spotlight on Research Fees: Trends in Cost-per-Subject Pricing, 3
J. CLINICAL RESEARCH BEST PRACS. 3 (March 2007) (“From 2000 to 2005, the price that
sponsors pay U.S. research sites per subject for Phase II and III trials increased by 42% . . .
[and] the complexity of these clinical studies, as measured by the total number of procedures
performed, increased by 49%. . . . [T]he rest of the world . . . saw costs increase by 43% and
complexity by 60%.”); Bruse Booth & Rodney Zemmel, Prospect for Productivity, 3
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 451, 454 (May 2004) (showing a five-fold increase in
clinical trial costs from 1991 to 2000, and claiming “the industry trend towards more tests per
patient and more patients per trial has led to significant increases in the direct costs of clinical
trials”). But see Eric L. Eisenstein et al., Sensible Approaches for Reducing Clinical Trial
Costs, 5 CLINICAL TRIALS 75 (2008). “Over the past decade . . . funding for phase 1–4 clinical
trials . . . has increased from 37 to 64% of their biomedical research expenditures. However,
Food and Drug Administration approvals of new molecular entities dropped from 35.5 to 23.3
entities per year over the same period.” Id. at 76. Nevertheless, “[o]ur results suggest that it
is possible to reduce significantly the costs of clinical trials without adversely impacting their
scientific objectives. The resulting cost savings would provide increased funding so that
additional therapies could be tested and made available for patient care.” Id. at 83.
38. Pierre Azoulay, The Changing Economics of Clinical Development, Earth Inst.
(May 20, 2004) (slide 7 showed 38,044 mean pages per NDA in 1977-1980 and 90,650 in 19891992, an increase of 138%). See also Hamilton Moses, III et al., Financial Anatomy of
Biomedical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1333, 1337 (2005) (Table 3 showing Phase 1-3
trial spending growing from $3.1 billion in 1994 to $14.2 billion in 2003).
39. THE DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: INCREASING EFFICIENCY AND COSTEFFECTIVENESS 338-39 (Peter G. Welling et al. eds., Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1996) (“According
to the Boston Consulting Group, the average number of patients in clinical trials per New
Drug Application has almost tripled from 1321 in 1981-1984 compared with 3567 in 1989-1992
while, over the same period, the average number of clinical studies per NDA increased from
about 30 to 60 and the number of pages per NDA increased from approximately 45,000 to
90,000[.]”) (citing S. Engel & J.F. Jalkiewicz, Mixing up a New Formula, (12)(15) MED AD.
NEWS 3, 1993). See also Jeffrey S. Handen, Drug Discovery in the Modern Age: How We Got
Here and What Does It Mean?, in INDUSTRIALIZATION OF DRUG DISCOVERY: FROM
TARGET SELECTION THROUGH LEAD OPTIMIZATION 7-8 (Jeffrey S. Handen ed., CRC
Press 2005) (“The average number of studies per NDA has increased from 30 in the early
1980s to 70 in the mid-1990s. The number of pages per NDA has increased from an average
of 38,000 in the late 1970s to in excess of 100,000 in the mid-1990s. The average number of
patients per NDA has increased from 1321 in the early 1980s to 4327 in the mid 1990s.”)
(citing ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN 2000, CMR
INTERNATIONAL (Surrey, U.K.)).
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40

11% per year in clinical trial costs. Moreover, “[t]he most obvious risk
in drug development is that, despite a long and costly development
process, most new drug candidates will not reach the market. Failure
can result from toxicity, carcinogenicity, manufacturing difficulties,
inconvenient dosing characteristics, inadequate efficacy, economic and
41
competitive factors, and various other problems.”
Reportedly, about 20% of all compounds entering trials survive to
42
FDA approval. If one combines the actual costs of clinical trials that
succeed with the overall costs of those that fail, one arrives at the often
quoted price tag for each successful drug of $800,000 to $1 billion, which
includes the “risk premium” to recoup the costs of failed drug profits
43
and failed clinical tests.
It bears noting at the outset that while the private sector must
absorb these burdensome costs, the federal government has been
spending some thirty billion dollars annually to cover the even riskier
44
costs of upstream basic medical research conducted at universities.
Nevertheless, the soaring costs of clinical trials in developed countries
are a fact of life that will not go away. The demand for global
protection of clinical tests largely arises from underlying concerns about
perceived free-riding on private-sector R&D investments to cover these
costs. Such concerns must be taken into account when evaluating the
social costs to other countries, especially developing countries, of the
data protection measures based upon them.
B. The Domestic Response
While this Article is not primarily concerned with the situation in the
United States, it is instructive to observe that, until recently, the impact
on the public at large of measures to protect clinical test data in this
country has been relatively modest. Federal law currently gives
40. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 168 (Table 4 showing clinical trial costs growing at a
rate of 11.8% when capitalized cost is not considered and at 12.2% when capitalized cost is
considered).
41. Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 459.
42. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 165 (finding a 21.5% success rate).
43. Id. at 180 (DiMasi sums up the numbers from Fig. 2 at 167. But note this is the
capitalized cost of developing a new drug, including preclinical costs. Clinical costs as such
were estimated at $467 million per approved drug. Also note that these estimates are in year2000 dollars.).
44. Arti K. Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir & Colin Crosswell, Pathways
Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug
Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008) [hereinafter Rai et al., Pathways
Across the Valley of Death].
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originator companies a five-year period of exclusive marketing rights in
clinical trial data, which starts from the date the compound is approved
45
by the Federal Drug Administration.
Since 1987, the European
Community Members have provided protection for data filed in support
of marketing authorizations for pharmaceuticals, which can now last
from eight to eleven years, and this form of protection has subsequently
46
been extended to other product areas in Europe. Analogous forms of
protection have been enacted in many other countries since the TRIPS
47
Agreement entered into force.
The basic five-year period established in U.S. law is independent of
48
the originator’s patent rights, which last for a period of twenty years.
Because the patent granting process and the regulatory approval
process, including clinical trials, are long, the effective patent life is
considerably shorter than the statutory period of twenty years. In
theory, the period of market exclusivity could extend the effective
period of patent exclusivity by denying generic producers the right to
rely on the originator’s existing clinical trial results for another five
years. In practice, however, with regard to traditional small-molecule
compounds, there is little or no impact on consumers because the five45. Concerns about preserving the confidentiality of regulatory data have surfaced only
in the last 25 years. TREVOR M. COOK, SPECIAL REPORT: THE PROTECTION OF
REGULATORY DATA IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER SECTORS (Sweet & Maxwell
2000). Since 1982, the United States has adopted provisions to protect regulatory data
submitted to federal agencies in connection with pesticides under the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Id. at 7; 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. In 1984, the United
States also adopted regulatory exclusivity provisions for clinical trial data, which reportedly
provide a de facto measure of regulatory data protection and which now provide five
years [of] such protection for new chemical entities and three years for data filed in
support of . . . chemical entities which have already been approved for use in
medicines but [for] which fresh authorizations are [to be] based on new clinical
investigations.
COOK, supra note 45, at 7. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, 98 P.L. 417 (Sep. 24, 1984); 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(c)(3)(D), 355(j)(5) (reprinted in 21
C.F.R. § 314.108) (1993). The five-year period of exclusivity extends from the approval of the
original drug to the approval of a generic version based on bioequivalence. Pugatch,
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 10, at 103.
46. Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March
2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code Relating to Medicinal
Products for Human Use, 05 EC, 30 April, L136/34; Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra
note 10, at 105. See also Junod, supra note 9; Carlos M. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 69 (2002) [hereinafter Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement]; Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23.
47. See generally Taubman, supra note 30.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
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year period of data exclusivity runs concurrently with the period of
patent protection and is usually absorbed into its duration with little
49
overlap.
There is, however, a gray area where clinical data are used to justify
new indications of chemical entities that have already been approved,
which can yield another three-year term of exclusivity in the United
States. This three-year term “for making product changes that require
clinical trials to gain approval” starts with the approval of the
50
supplemental application. In such cases, uncertainty in the rules could
reportedly lead to delays in the entry of generic producers beyond the
51
life of the patent itself.
Pending legislative proposals, if enacted, could confer twelve to
fourteen years of market exclusivity on data pertaining to approved
biological medicines, that is, the large molecule medicines that are
52
currently attracting considerable attention. Here there are questions
about the FDA’s ability to approve so-called bio-similar generics, which
are not chemical compounds and which depend on materials that are
deemed bioequivalent or sufficiently bio-similar as to justify reliance on
the originator’s test data without need to conduct new tests on the

49. Professor Rebecca Eisenberg states, “The five-year period of data exclusivity for a
new chemical entity begins with first market approval and therefore often runs concurrently
with patent protection, although in some cases it may last longer.” Rebecca Eisenberg, The
Role Of The FDA In Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 360
(2007). Footnote nine in Eisenberg’s article notes an exception: Paxil gained marketing
exclusivity via this mechanism after the patents on it had expired. Id. at 348.
50. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 360; Junod, supra note 9.
51. Junod, supra note 9. But see Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 360 (“The data exclusivity
thereby gained is limited to the terms of the new approval, and will not prevent a competitor
from using an ANDA to sell the product as previously approved, or for previously approved
indications. This has proven to be a very significant limitation on the use of a supplemental
NDA to gain approval to market a drug for a new indication.”).
52. PATHWAY FOR BIOSIMILARS ACT, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008). The Pathway
for Biosimilars Act provides in § 101(k)(7) for twelve years of exclusivity for the “reference
product,” but it does not consider evergreening applications relevant. Id. Exclusivity is
extended up to fourteen years from initial approval if a significant new indication is approved
as a supplement within eight years of the original approval. Id. An additional six months to
the twelve or fourteen year exclusivity term can be awarded for discovery of beneficial
pediatric use. Id. Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007 had the same
twelve year term but not the fourteen year term or pediatric extension. BIOLOGICS PRICE
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2007, S. 1695, 110th Cong. § 2(k)(7) (2007). A
biological product is defined as “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood,
blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product . . . applicable to the
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” Public Health
Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2002). See Marc A. Goshko, U.S. Legislative Considerations
th
for Generic Biologics, 10 Annual IGPA Conference (Nov. 29, 2007).
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generic product.
Because the methods of scientific assessment are
different for biologics than for small-molecule compounds, there are
unanswered legal, economic, and administrative questions in this area.
For example, one economist knowledgeable about the industry
estimates that the breakeven point for producers of biologics is much
higher than that for small molecules, largely because of higher risk of
54
failure in Phase III clinical trials.
The pending legislation would enable the FDA to recognize biosimilarity for purposes of generic entry in exchange for a marketing
exclusivity period (derived from the costs of data) for twelve to fourteen
years. If enacted, this provision could extend beyond the effective life
of the patent, which would otherwise be shortened by the years
needed—sometimes as much as ten years—to obtain regulatory
55
approval in the first instance.
C. The Drive for Global Protection of Clinical Trial Data
The United States and the European Union have been seeking
universal norms to protect the results of clinical trial data on new
pharmaceutical products through bilateral and multilateral trade
56
negotiations. When developing countries agree to this new form of
53. Two U.S. statutes apply to the regulation of biological products. See Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 30.1 et seq. (FFDCA); Public Health Services Act, 42
U.S.C. § 262 (PHSA). See also Goshko, supra note 52.
54. Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for New Biological Entities (June 2007)
(working paper, on file with Duke Univ. Dept. Econ.) [hereinafter Grabowski, Data
Exclusivity],
available
at
http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papger/PDF/DataExclusivityWorkingPapers.pdf.
Professor
Grabowski’s elegant analysis makes no mention of the role that government funding might
play with regard to biologics, and no independent verification of his figures has so far been
found. Id.
55. However, there are other existing measures that may partly compensate patentees
for this loss of effective patent life. See Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, 35 U.S.C. §
271(e) (1994).
56. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2008), available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/2008_Special_301_Report
/Section_Index.html; PRESIDENT’S 2007 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2006 ANNUAL
REPORT,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Trade_Policy
_ Agenda/asset_upload_file278_10622.pdf (mentions test data protection as an issue multiple
times). But see PRESIDENT’S 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2007 ANNUAL REPORT,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/
/2008_Trade_Policy_Agenda /asset_upload_file490_14556.pdf (While the report does not
mention test data protection, this omission was not a change in policy, just in public
emphasis). Is this a change in policy or just in public emphasis? Data exclusivity has now
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intellectual property protection, their rights to promote the production
of generic drugs and low-priced medicines generally, as clarified in the
Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
57
58
Health and in related implementing decisions, can become
compromised by the new, exclusive rights in clinical test data, which are
59
not directly covered by those arrangements.
1. From NAFTA (1992) to TRIPS (1994)
NAFTA was a kind of blueprint for the TRIPS Agreement of 1994.
It set out, and largely obtained, many of the IP objectives that USTR
hoped to later codify during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations.
a. The NAFTA Provisions
The NAFTA provisions on intellectual property established two
important principles with regard to clinical test data. One was that
clinical data submissions to governments for regulatory approval of new
chemical entities must be protected against non-disclosure, or at least
60
“unfair commercial use.” The other was that a generic producer could
not rely on pre-existing test data for regulatory approval based on
“bioequivalence and bioavailability studies” for a period of at least five

also surfaced in confidential negotiations between the European Union and developing
countries on European Economic Partnership Agreements.
57. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.doc.
58. General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc; General Council, Amendment of
the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641, (Dec. 8, 2005), with attachment, Protocol Amending the
TRIPS Agreement (Annex setting out pending Article 31bis).
59. See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 962-65 (2007).
60. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S.-Mex., art. 1711.5, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 675 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] provides as follows:
If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing of pharmaceutical or
agricultural products that utilize new chemical entities, the submission of
undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the use of such
products is safe and effective, the Party shall protect against disclosure of the data of
persons making such submissions, where the origination of such data involves
considerable effort, except where the disclosure is necessary to protect the public or
unless steps are taken to ensure the data is protected against unfair commercial use.
Id.
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years “from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person
that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking
account of the nature of the data and the person’s efforts and
61
expenditures in producing them.”
This innocuous sounding provision could have produced new
barriers to generic producers because it seemed to open a five-year
window of market exclusivity in Canada and Mexico for drugs that were
not otherwise patented there for one reason or another, or for drugs
whose period of patent protection in those countries was about to
expire. However, these effects were tempered by the ambiguous
language in a third provision, which seemed to allow a regulatory
authority room to approve a drug by expressly “relying” on the date of
62
first approval in the originator country, say, the United States. In that
case, the five year period would probably run contemporaneously with
the U.S. patent and not necessarily add any appreciable time of
63
independent exclusivity in Canada or Mexico.
Despite the ambiguity inherent in these provisions, the Bayer
pharmaceutical company contended that Canada had violated the treaty
when it gave regulatory approval to a generic drug based on a showing
of bioequivalence. The crux of the argument was that this approval
violated the requirement that clinical test data must be protected

61. Article 1711.6 of NAFTA provides as follows:
Each Party shall provide that for data subject to Paragraph 5 that are submitted to
the Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no person other than
the person that submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, rely on such
data in support of an application for product approval during a reasonable period of
time after their submission. For this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally
mean not less than five years from the date on which the Party granted approval to
the person that produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account
of the nature of the data and the person’s efforts and expenditures in producing
them. Subject to this provision, there shall be no limitation on any Party to
implement abbreviated approval procedures for such products on the basis of
bioequivalence and bioavailability studies.
NAFTA, supra note 60, art. 1711.6.
62. Article 1711.7 of NAFTA provides as follows, “Where a Party relies on a
marketing approval granted by another Party, the reasonable period of exclusive use of the
data submitted in connection with obtaining the approval relied on shall begin with the date
of the first marketing approval relied on.” NAFTA, supra note 60, art. 1711.7.
63. This conclusion disregards the ambiguities that might arise from data showing new
indications for an existing chemical entity. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. For
the view that United States practice underlies the three provisions set out in Article 1711 of
NAFTA, which deal explicitly with regulatory data through Articles 1711.5, 1711.6, and
1711.7, see COOK, supra note 45, at 7.
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64

“against unfair commercial use.” In 1999, however, a Canadian court
held that Canada was not barred from approving a competitor’s generic
drug without at least five years of protection from competition when
that competitor had based his application for marketing approval on a
65
comparison with the innovator’s own product.
The Court held that the safety and effectiveness of the
generic product could be demonstrated by showing that the
competitor’s product was the pharmaceutical bioequivalent of
the innovator’s product, which was being publicly marketed.
Because the minister need not rely upon the confidential
information as such in that event, the minimum five-year market
protection otherwise available under domestic regulations did
not apply.
By the same token, the Court held that Articles 1711.5 and
1711.6 of NAFTA did not require a different outcome so long as
the generic manufacturer was able “to establish the safety and
effectiveness of its product on the basis of bioequivalence or bioavailability studies without the minister having to examine and
rely on confidential data filed by the innovator.” Such a
demonstration was not an “unfair commercial use” within the
purview of either the Canadian regulation or Article 1711, which
“do not provide or require that the innovator be protected from
66
competition.”
b. The Softer TRIPS Provisions
Logically, the United States sought to build upon, and strengthen, its
NAFTA blueprint during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, which lasted from 1986 to 1994. These proposals, which
met with strong resistance from the outset, survived into the Brussels
67
Draft of the TRIPS Agreement in 1990. Here, however, they appeared
in a bracketed provision that marked off the United States’ (and
64. Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.) (Trial Division), [1998] 1 F.C. 553, T-1154-97
(Can.), affirmed by [1999] 243 N.R. 170 (Fed. Ct. App.) (Can.), appeal denied [2000] 259 N.R.
200 (Can.); Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 135-39. See also BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2005] 1 SCR 533, 2005 SCC 26.
65. Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [1999] 243 N.R. 170 (Fed. Ct. App.) (Can.),
appeal denied [2000] N.R. 200 (Can.).
66. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 143.
67. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Brussels, Belgium, Nov. 26, 1990, art. 42 [hereinafter Brussels Draft
TRIPS Agreement 1990], compiled in STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 260 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
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European Union’s) position from those of other countries opposed to
recognizing any period or principle of exclusive marketing rights
attributable to the submission of clinical test data as such. This
bracketed provision would, in effect, have required nonuse of the
information for the approval of competing products for no less than five
68
years, unless the originator who submitted the data otherwise agreed.
One year later, in an effort to reach a final agreement, the Chairman’s
Draft Final Act (the so-called Dunkel Draft of 1991) discarded the
69
bracketed U.S.-EU proposal altogether. The Dunkel Draft, with only
minor technical changes, was then adopted as Article 39.3 of the TRIPS
70
Agreement in 1996.
Article 39, as a whole, constituted an historic achievement in that it
brought trade secret protection within the ambit of the Paris
Convention’s existing provisions mandating worldwide measures against
71
unfair competition. However, as I explained in a previous article, the
68. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 135-39. Article 4A contained
a bracketed provision that marks off the United States (and European Union) positions from
those of other countries opposed to this new form of protection for regulatory data. This
proposed provision is reproduced as follows: “PARTIES, when requiring, as a condition of
approving the marketing of new pharmaceutical products or of agricultural chemical
products, . . . the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use.”
Brussels Draft TRIPS Agreement of 1990, supra note 67, art. 4A, at 2308. Unless the person
submitting the information agrees, the data may not be relied upon for the approval of
competing products for a reasonable time, generally no less than five years, commensurate
with the efforts involved in the origination of the data, their nature, and the expenditure
involved in their preparation. “In addition, PARTIES shall protect such data against
disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public.” Id. This proposal applied the
regulatory data provision to cover approval of “new pharmaceutical products or of a new
A
agricultural chemical product.”
STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND:
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 2308. In addition, the bracketed provision essentially
required “protection against unfair commercial use and disclosure, as well as non-use of the
information for the approval of competing products, for no less than five years, unless the
person submitting the information agrees.” Id. (italics supplied).
69. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, 20 December 1991, art. 39.3 [hereinafter Dunkel Draft], compiled in
STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 869
(Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993).
70. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which
involves considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use.
In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are
protected against unfair commercial use.
Dunkel Draft, supra note 69.
71. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis, Mar. 20,
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collocation of clinical test data within the provisions regulating unfair
competition negated any inference that the TRIPS drafters had imposed
an exclusive intellectual property right on this subject matter and
indirectly confirmed the implications to be drawn from the deletion of
72
the U.S.-EU bracketed proposal between 1990 and 1991.
As adopted, Article 39.3 of TRIPS merely obliged
WTO Members, when requiring the submission of undisclosed
tests or other data as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or agrochemical products that utilize new
chemical entities, to take positive action to protect such data
against ‘unfair commercial use.’ There is also an independent
obligation to protect such data against ‘disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public;’ but the text goes on to recognize
that the steps taken to prevent ‘unfair commercial use’ would
normally encompass and discharge the duty to protect such data
73
against ‘disclosure.’
WTO Members have no duty to “require . . . the submission of
undisclosed test or other data” and they may rely upon the health and
safety decisions of other jurisdictions, or on the published medical
literature, or a combination of both, without incurring liability under
Article 39.3. When a state does require the relevant submission of
undisclosed data, it remains free to make noncommercial uses of the
data and to make other uses of them that are “fair,” even if such uses
produce a commercial impact. For example, governmental use to avoid
health or safety risks revealed by the data in the local environment are
fair by definition. Similarly, the promotion of research and science in
the public interest “would presumably allow some uses of the data that
would be both noncommercial and fair, consistent with any research
74
exemption embodied in the domestic patent laws.”
In principle, the meaning of ‘unfair commercial use’ will
1883, as rev. at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention];
G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967 (BIRPI
1968). See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Harvard Univ. Press 1975).
72. See generally Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 135-39.
73. Id. at 141-42.
74. Id. Cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 27.2 (exception to patentability for
ordre public).
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depend upon the kind of practices that domestic and foreign
trade secret laws have traditionally regarded as unfair, together
with any new case law dealing specifically with the protection of
clinical test data as a distinct category of unfair competition law.
This follows from the fact that the drafters of Article 39.3
expressly linked it to Article 10bis of the Paris Convention and
thus to the duty it imposes to avoid any ‘act of competition
contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters’
75
([A]rticle 10bis(2)).
76

Many different scenarios may be imagined, including the possibility
that any given state might include “unjust enrichment” within the
77
purview of its domestic unfair competition law. In such a state, courts
could consider the extent to which allowing regulatory approval on the
basis of bioequivalence, without more, destroyed any incentive to
78
generate the data needed to bring the product to market, as well as the
extent to which that incentive had been amply sustained in the country
of origin (or other relevant countries). But none of these scenarios
necessarily justifies the five-year exclusive marketing right that the
Dunkel Draft definitively deleted in 1991.
As to case law precedents, they are not favorable to a tough
interpretation of the “nondisclosure” and fair use requirements of
Article 39.3. In the United States, for example, a 1984 Supreme Court
decision observed that the filing of confidential data prior to
congressional decisions to confer special protection upon such data
could not be construed as conferring any assurance against internal
agency use during the consideration of the application of a subsequent

75. Reichman, supra note 23 at 141-42. See also Paris Convention, supra note 71, art.
10bis(2); BODENHAUSEN, supra note 71.
76. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 141.
On its face, the provision requiring fairness seems clear only at the extremes. At
one pole, “disclosure” is expressly included within the concept of measures to
prevent unfair commercial use. Hence, states requiring the submission of clinical
trial data must take steps not to disclose the contents of these submissions to
unauthorized third parties. At the opposite pole, however, the duty to prevent
“unfair commercial use” arguably imposes a conduct-based liability rule, but not an
exclusive property right requiring only authorized uses of the data or of the health
and safety conclusions to which they lead. Otherwise, the deletion of the proposals
embodied in the Brussels Draft TRIPS Agreement of 1990 would be ignored.
Id.
77. See Taubman, supra note 30, at 601.
78. Id. at 602.
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79

firm for product registration. The reluctance of the U.S. Supreme
Court in that case to impose an unqualified restriction on the use of data
filed with regulatory authorities was expressly conditioned on the need
80
to sustain competition in unpatented products.
As noted above, moreover, “a similar decision was reached in the
[1999] case of Bayer Inc. v. Canada, in which the Canadian Federal
Court of Appeal construed Canadian law in light of Article 1711 of
81
NAFTA,” which resembles the provision adopted in Article 39.3. The
Canadian court found no grounds in this provision to bar regulatory
approval of generics on the basis of a showing of bioequivalence to
82
formulations approved under pre-existing data submissions.
In general, one may conclude that the TRIPS provisions set out in
Article 39.3 did expand the worldwide obligations of WTO members to
prohibit acts of unfair competition within the meaning of Article
83
10bis(3) of the Paris Convention. But incorporation of this provision
into Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (and by virtue of that
84
incorporation, of article 10bis into the TRIPS Agreement itself) in no
way enlarged the boundaries of the specific obligations codified in
85
Article 39.3. If anything, they further precluded any application of
Article 39.3 in a manner representing an exclusive property right, as
86
distinct from a conduct-based liability rule.
The ultimate meaning of ‘unfair commercial use’ under Article 39.3
“will depend upon the kind of practices that domestic and foreign trade
87
secret laws have traditionally regarded as unfair.” These practices are
79. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1019-20 (1984).
80. Id.
81. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 143.
82. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
The decision of the Canadian Court of Appeal is all the more compelling in that it
was taken in the face of the NAFTA regime, which, as previously observed, is
stronger [overall] than the regime ultimately adopted in Article 39.3 of the TRIP[s]
Agreement. The latter regime, which reflected a decision to delete provisions
analogous to those in Articles 1711.5 and 1711.6 of NAFTA, would mandate a
similar conclusion, even if the Canadian Court were to have misconstrued the
NAFTA provisions applicable in that case.
Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 143.
83. For an analysis, see id., at 137-44.
84. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 2.1.
85. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 137-44.
86. See Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at 8184.
87. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 144. For example,
governments should not set themselves up as commercial rivals who profit from the
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too diverse to establish any consensus–based rules of universal
88
application. However, Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement
does not prevent governments from relying upon decisions to
allow the [marketing] of relevant [medicines] in other
jurisdictions, nor does it prevent Members from authorizing the
[marketing] of bioequivalent products on the basis of positive
regulatory decisions by local authorities. Legislative history,
competition policy and sound principles of treaty interpretation
support this conclusion, as do important decisions in [at least]
89
two domestic courts.
2. The Posterior Free Trade Agreements
The soft provisions of the TRIPS Agreement were the most that the
technology-exporting countries could obtain at the multilateral level.
After 1994, the only substantive multilateral agreements were the
WIPO cyberspace treaties of 1996, and these produced a negotiated
middle ground in which users’ and consumers’ interests were relatively
90
well balanced against those of rights holders’. Since then, efforts to
ratchet up patent protection at the multilateral level have been blocked
91
by developing country resistance, and a coalition of those countries
plus non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) has put a Development
Agenda, with emphasis on “Access to Knowledge,” at the forefront of
92
WIPO’s future work program.

submission of regulatory data. They must impede state employees from doing the same and
they must impede citizens from gaining access to confidential regulatory data by devious
means. Id.
88. Taubman, supra note 30, at 602.
89. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 144.
90. WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/
[hereinafter WCT]; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/ [hereinafter WPPT]; Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme
B. Dinwoodie, & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable
Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
981 (2007).
91. Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85,
99-122 (2007).
92. WIPO, Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP), Second
Session, July 2008, Revised Draft Report, WIPO doc. CDIP/2/4 Prov. 2 (November 21, 2008)
(Annex I, Information on Activities in Respect of 19 Adopted Recommendations); Amy
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual
Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework
for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0147 (2004).
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93

As Professor Ruth Okediji and others have observed, the response
of the technology-exporting countries was to shift their negotiating
efforts to regional and bilateral trade agreements, where their
94
bargaining position was disproportionately stronger. In one FTA after
another, ever tighter and more unbalanced intellectual property
provisions have been accepted by governments willing to pay almost any
95
price for the trade concessions offered them in other areas.
a. Expanding Protection for Clinical Trial Data in Developing
Countries
Why developing countries at all economic levels have succumbed to
the one-sided, virtually nonnegotiable intellectual property provisions
that USTR has imposed upon them in the various FTAs remains
96
unclear. Certainly, it was not for lack of technical expertise or advice.
If anything, the negotiators representing the Latin American countries,
for example, often evidenced more skill and ability than their USTR
counterparts, who took their marching orders from a “knowledge
97
cartel” without engaging in overly subtle nuances of persuasion. In

93. Ruth Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual
Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2004); Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS and
Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 260 (D.J.
Gervais ed., Oxford 2007).
94. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(2004).
95. Timmermans, supra note 11. Note the status of treaties: Establishment of a Free
Trade Area, U.S. – Jordan FTA, Oct. 24, 2000; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Singapore FTA,
May 6, 2003; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Chile FTA, June 6, 2003; Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.–Morocco FTA, June 15, 2004; Free Trade Agreement, Dom. Rep.–Cent. America, Aug.
5, 2004; Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.–Bahrain FTA, Sep. 14, 2004;
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.–Oman, Nov. 15, 2004; Establishment of a Free
Trade Area, U.S.–Australia FTA, May 18, 2005; Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.–
Peru FTA, Apr. 12, 2006. Additional FTAs have been signed with Colombia, Panama, and
Korea but have not been ratified by Congress. For a complete list, with reference to clinical
test data protection, see Taubman, supra note 30, 594 n. 24.
96. See, e.g., Fink & Reichenmiller, supra note 27. See also William Watson & Viet D.
Do, Economic Analysis of Regional Trade Agreements, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 3-22 (L. Bartels & F. Ortino eds., Oxford 2006).
97. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME 3-45, 19 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Maskus & Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods]. See
generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).
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virtually every case, the intellectual property provisions, left to the end
of the negotiations, were put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As
each single state or group of states succumbed to the latest set of
demands, USTR elevated past demands to a new and higher level in the
next round of negotiations. As Professor Bryan Mercurio recently
observed, “the current bilateralism unashamedly seeks to fragment
developing country coalitions while at the same time taking advantage
98
of unequal bargaining power in bilateral negotiations.”
Whether, at the end of the day, the aggregate value of the overall
trade concessions obtained by the central administrations in these FTAs
justifies or compensates for the losses accruing from rents and other
99
restrictions on intellectual property is not for me to adjudicate.
Whatever the gains, there is reason to believe that the central
administrations that sign these agreements have undervalued or ignored
the social costs of these intellectual property provisions. If so, the
hidden costs will likely play out in terms of hampering the delivery of
essential public goods, such as public health, education, agriculture, and
scientific research, which remain heavily dependent on the public sector
in these countries, owing to the rising costs of knowledge goods and
100
other inputs needed for the delivery of these same public goods.
While there remain some defensive options that states may still take,
101
even after these treaties enter into force, there is little evidence that
98. Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 221 (Lorand Bartels & Frederico
Ortino eds., 2006).
99. For the difficulties in evaluating outcomes, see, e.g., Watson & Do, supra note 96.
100. See Maskus & Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods, supra
note 97. But see Gervais, supra note 93, for a more optimistic view.
101. For measures pertaining specifically to clinical trial data, see, e.g., Timmermans,
supra note 11, at 207-08:
1) “Limiting the duration of data exclusivity, and/or specifying that it cannot extend
beyond the patent term ;”
2) “Limiting the scope of data exclusivity” to new chemical entities;
3) Requiring rapid registration of new medicines;
4) Allow compulsory licenses of clinical trial data;
5) Allow waivers of data exclusivity on specified public health grounds.
Id. For defensive measures pertaining to other public goods, see, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21 (2004); Ruth L. Okediji,
Sustainable Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Jerome Reichman & Keith Maskus eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Okediji, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS]; P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ &
RUTH L. OKEDIJI, OPEN SOCIETY INST., CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT
ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT, FINAL REPORT (2008); Abbott &
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governments will actually resort to these measures (except, perhaps, in
the public health area) for fear of incurring retaliatory pressure from
102
major economic powers.
Meanwhile, one government after another continues to sign these
FTAs, and the protectionist tide, which rises with each new agreement,
then spreads around the world via the TRIPS Agreement’s own MFN
clause, which—unlike that of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
103
Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”)—is virtually unlimited in its sweep. As a
result, the tangle of ever-tighter FTA provisions on intellectual property
104
become de facto candidates for multilateral recognition in the future.
Within this context, numerous TRIPS-plus provisions have been
adopted that bear on regulatory approval of generics in general and the
105
use of clinical trial data in particular. For example, several U.S. FTAs
introduce so-called linkage clauses, which can prevent the regulatory
authorities from granting approval to a generic version of a drug under
106
patent without the approval of the patent holder.
These constraints
may apply even if bioequivalence has otherwise been demonstrated. In
such cases, the agency responsible for safety and efficacy of drugs is
suddenly charged with observing questions of patentability,
infringement, and related intellectual property issues, for which it lacks
competence. The patent holder can short circuit both an infringement
Reichman, supra note 59.
102. For evidence of both bold measures and retaliatory pressures in the public health
arena, see Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 949-57; Brazil, Thailand Lose Trading
Privileges in Wake of IP Disputes, Food & Drug Letter, Aug. 17, 2007 (“Two countries
recently accused of violating pharmaceutical intellectual property (IP) rights have now lost
certain trading privileges with the U.S. The Bush administration removed Brazil and
Thailand from the list of developing countries that receive duty-free treatment for certain
exports, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab announced June 28.”).
103. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 4; Mercurio, supra note 98. See also
ICTSD/UNCTAD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBookIndex.htm
[hereinafter ICTSD/UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK].
104. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 71.1; Taubman, supra note 30, 603-04.
105. See, e.g., Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 81-96; Pugatch,
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 10, at 126; Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and
Reaction: Developments and Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27-40 (Pedro Roffe et al.
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Abbott, NEGOTIATING HEALTH].
106. See, e.g., Chile–U.S. FTA § 17.10.2(c), June 6, 2003, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html
(accessed Jan. 18, 2009); Oman–U.S. FTA §15.9.4(a), Nov. 15, 2004 (pending
implementation),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html
(accessed Jan. 18, 2009).
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action and the generic producer’s process of marketing approval by
reaching above their heads, so to speak. The ability of these linkage
provisions to block regulatory approval where enforced can thus
sidestep many of the important flexibilities preserving state control of
107
public health, including compulsory licenses.
With regard to test data exclusivity as such, recent FTAs seek to
specify time periods during which the national regulatory authorities
cannot rely on the clinical studies and data provided by originators for
purposes of approving generic drugs on the basis of bioequivalence or
108
similar standards. In effect, these FTAs reimpose prescribed periods
of nonuse in the manner of the bracketed U.S.-EU proposal that was
109
deleted from the draft TRIPS Agreement in 1991. Unless the generic
manufacturer undertakes its own costly and wastefully duplicative
clinical trials, which could elevate the cost of the generic substitute, it
must sit on the sidelines for the specified period of time, usually no less
than five years, even when there is no underlying patent on the product
110
itself, as often occurs in developing countries.
In other words, the data exclusivity provision in FTAs with
developing countries operates independently of any patent protection
the originator may possess, and of any R&D costs it may otherwise have
recouped in OECD countries. As a result, drugs that are off patent or
111
otherwise denied retroactive patent protection under TRIPS may
nonetheless remain off limits to would be generic producers in
developing countries for the specified period of marketing exclusivity.
Under a growing number of these FTAs, the United States originator
need not have sought to register the drug at all in the relevant country
for marketing approval. The drug may simply remain off the market
altogether because the would-be local producer cannot overcome the
data exclusivity barrier for the specified period, usually at least five
112
years.
Other provisions in some FTAs can effectively extend the nonuse
period by adding on another five year “waiting period.” This result is
107. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 225-26; Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra
note 23; Abbott, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 105.
108. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 226-27; Correa, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra
note 23.
109. See supra notes 68-70; supra Part C(1)(b).
110. See Mercurio, supra note 98; Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 46.
111. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 70.1.
112. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 227.
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achieved by prohibiting the generic manufacturer from relying on data
provided for regulatory approval in another country for a specified five
year period (assuming that country requires local registration within
113
that five year period). Such provisions enable an originator company
to register the drug in its home country, wait five years, and then submit
the drug for marketing approval in other FTA countries, whose generic
industries must then wait out another five years of market exclusivity
114
derived from clinical test data protection.
Moreover, the “new chemical entity” language used in TRIPS and
some of the early FTAs has given way to language mandating data
115
protection for any new product in recent agreements. Here is where
originators of older, pre-existing products have the greatest
opportunities to obtain exclusive marketing rights, without any new
expenditures on R&D or clinical trials.
The data exclusivity provisions, like the linkage provisions, can also
be used to undermine the FTA state’s otherwise clear rights to impose
compulsory licenses to address public health issues. To the extent this
tactic succeeds, it defeats the public health safeguards otherwise
adopted by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
116
Health, as well as the implementing legislation, in both a waiver and a
117
pending Amendment to Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. These
multilateral flexibilities were meant to enable countries without
manufacturing capacity to obtain needed medicines from other
118
countries through back-to-back compulsory licenses.
Still other TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs can directly or indirectly
affect access to generic medicines by imposing patent term extensions,
express limits on the power to invoke compulsory licenses, and limits on
119
parallel imports.
With specific regard to data exclusivity provisions,
the cumulative effect of these FTAs is, as Professor Mercurio observes,
to make “the cost of the resulting [generic] drugs . . . rise considerably as

113. See, e.g., Oman–U.S. FTA, art. 15.9.1(b) (2004); Australia–U.S. FTA, art.
17.10.1(c) (2005).
114. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 227-28.
115. Id. at 228.
116. See supra note 57; Timmermans, supra note 11; Mercurio, supra note 98, at 228-29.
117. See supra note 58. See also Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property:
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 82 et seq.
(2004) [hereinafter Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property].
118. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59.
119. See Mercurio, supra note 98, at 229-35; Abbott, supra note 105. These provisions
are beyond the scope of this Article.
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well as [to] delay the generics introduction into the [relevant]
120
marketplace.”
b. Recent Constraints on USTR’s Negotiating Mandate
As explained in a previous article, the new majority in the U.S.
Congress intervened in 2007 to modify some of the most extreme
121
provisions set out in signed but theretofore unratified FTAs (including
122
that with Colombia ). This new template removes most of the
language providing extraterritorial effect for the submission of
regulatory data in the United States (and elsewhere) for
123
pharmaceuticals, which, if properly implemented, could avoid the
extra five year “waiting period” discussed above. There is also some
ambiguous language linking the term of marketing exclusivity in an
FTA country whose generic producers rely on bioequivalence to the
term available in the country whose approval was relied upon, under
124
certain conditions.
Other sources report an understanding to the effect that the data
exclusivity provisions in these still to be ratified agreements should not,
of themselves, restrict the FTA countries’ ability to invoke compulsory
125
licenses.
This remains to be seen. If true, its impact on previously
120. Mercurio, supra note 98, at 227. He adds that “duplication of testing is arguably
unethical, as it simply is repetition . . . where the safety and efficacy of a product has already
been determined.” Id. See also Timmermans, supra note 11.
121. See generally Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 962-65.
122. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT ON TRADE
POLICY:
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
(May
2007),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/
asset_upload_file945_11283.pdf, but note that the legislation implementing the Peru FTA was
signed into law on December 14, 2008, United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-138, 121 Stat. 1455.
123. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 964.
124. See id. at 964-65.
125. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts, Bipartisan
Agreement on Trade Policy: Intellectual Property Provisions, May 2007, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/asset_upload_file312_11283.
pdf; Brand-Name Drug Industry Alarmed At IPR Precedent of FTA Template, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 18, 2007.
The [bipartisan Congressional] agreement contains three main provisions: a reduced
period of time in which generic companies are restricted from using brand-name test
data to approve generic drugs, an end to the requirement that a foreign health
regulator would have to certify that a generic drug does not violate a patent before
extending marketing approval, and language giving countries the option of
extending patent duration if a patent approval does not happen on a timely basis.
These elements apply only to FTAs negotiated with Peru, Panama and Colombia as
developing countries, but do not apply to the FTA with Korea as an industrialized
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ratified FTAs must also be clarified.
In any event, most of the provisions discussed above will remain in
effect, depending on the particular terms of specific FTAs, regardless of
the template applicable to agreements yet to be ratified. A minimum
period of five years’ marketing exclusivity can thus generally be
126
expected, with the consequences discussed above. Moreover, the U.S.
FTAs, which operate in favor of the European Union and other
127
countries by dint of the MFN clause of TRIPS, may be further
reinforced by the European Union’s own bilateral trade agreements—
so-called European Partnership Agreements (“EPAs”)—which may add
serious enforcement obligations to the normative provisions under
128
review.
Developing countries that enter into FTAs with the United States or
into EPAs with the European Union along the lines of those currently
proposed will thus be constrained “to provide a very strong market
dominant position for pharmaceutical originator companies, and . . . to
129
create substantial obstacles to the introduction of generic products.”
Among these obstacles, the market exclusivity provisions attributable to
clinical test data remain particularly troubling.
D. A Missed Opportunity: The Cost-Sharing Alternative
Sad as this survey of FTA provisions is, it becomes even sadder to
think that a better negotiating strategy, if adopted early on, might at
least have attenuated some of the potential harm to public health and
consumers documented above. To this end, the developing countries
might have counter-offered some measure of added protection for
clinical trial data when negotiating FTAs without acquiescing in the
exclusive rights model. A logical alternative would have been to
recognize the alleged “free rider” problem by acquiescing in a
reasonable royalty for use of the originator’s clinical trial data during a
130
specified period, as already occurs in U.S. law for test data pertaining
country.
Id.
126. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 964.
127. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
128. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 965-69.
129. Id. at 969.
130. This strategy was first proposed by Reichman in meetings at Bellagio, Italy and
New Delhi, India and quickly endorsed by James Love and Robert Weissman. See
Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 145; Robert Weissman, Data
Protection: Options for Implementation, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL
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131

to pesticides and fertilizers.
Such an approach would have invoked
the concept of “liability rules”—that is, take and pay rules—rather than
exclusive property rights, which require the owner’s consent to specified
132
uses of the property in question.
1. An Early U.S. Proposal Envisioned a Liability Rule
In the late 1980s, the United States multilateral trade negotiators
had submitted a proposal that required nonuse of trade secrets
“submitted to carry out governmental functions” or for “commercial or
competitive benefit” of either the government or third parties “except
with the right holder’s consent, on payment of the reasonable value of
133
use” or if a reasonable period of exclusive use was given the right
holder. The initial United States position thus appeared willing to
consider a cost-sharing or “liability rule” approach, based on
compensatory royalties, as an alternative to the exclusive property right
approach embodied in NAFTA. This proposal would have been
consistent with some pre-existing American practice with regard to test
data for fertilizers and pesticides, which obtain a period of data
exclusivity followed by another period of free use by any second comer
134
who pays equitable compensation.
If this approach were applied to clinical trials for medicines, it would
enable governments and generic producers to rely upon both test data
and positive regulatory outcomes elsewhere in order to market
equivalent or competing products otherwise permitted under
international intellectual property law, “provided that the second

PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 151-78 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH]; James Love, Four Practical Measures to Enhance
Access to Medical Technologies, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 241-56 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Love,
NEGOTIATING HEALTH]. See, most recently, Aaron X. Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and
Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval
Data Under the TRIPS Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443 (2004); Taubman, supra note 30,
at 598.
131. See U.S. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rotenticide Act [hereinafter FIFRA],
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2004).
132. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972); Jerome H.
Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable
Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000) [hereinafter Reichman, Of Green Tulips].
133. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 144-45 (citing authorities).
See also Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130.
134. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2004); Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH,
supra note 130.
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comers paid a reasonable royalty to the data originators to help defray
135
their costs of R&D.” Such an approach would address any perceived
free rider problem that arises from the enormous costs of conducting
clinical trials for new pharmaceutical products under existing FDA
standards, without creating barriers to entry or other anti-competitive
effects flowing from the inability of local governments to implement the
flexibilities that the TRIPS Agreement makes available.
Notwithstanding these advantages, no cost-sharing proposals
appeared in the FTAs concluded with the United States before 2007,
nor, until recently, was there evidence that developing countries had
seriously put such proposals forward. One reason is that acceptance of
a cost-sharing approach would arguably diminish the victory achieved in
obtaining the so-called “misappropriation approach,” embodied in
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement as it stands, which the foregoing
analysis suggests lacks teeth. Other objections are that brand name
companies already obtain enough compensation from the patent system
generally and that, in developing countries, the consumer interest in
low-priced medicines outweighs the brand name company’s claim to
136
additional compensation for generating data.
The problem with this position is that resistance to the exclusive
rights model has largely failed. Governments that are eager to sign
FTAs thus find themselves saddled with ever harsher exclusive rights
clauses without even attempting to fall back on counter proposals
sounding in compensatory liability principles.
Recently, however, the Korean government successfully negotiated
a cost-sharing clause for clinical trial data in its Free Trade Agreement
137
with the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) countries,
135. Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23, at 145.
136. Cf. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation
in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 197
(2005) (arguing the case for deviations from stringent intellectual property law and policies to
“permit . . . the broadest possible dissemination of pharmaceutical innovation” in poor
countries).
137. See Annex XIII (Article 3) to the EFTA-Korea FTA, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/eftakorfta.pdf:
The Parties shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with Article 39 of
the TRIPS Agreement. The Parties shall prevent applicants for marketing approval
for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products from relying on undisclosed
test or other undisclosed data, the origination of which involves a considerable
effort, submitted by the first applicant to the competent authority for marketing
approval for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products, utilizing new
chemical entities, for an adequate number of years from the date of approval, except
where approval is sought for original products. Any Party may instead allow in their
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although this Agreement has not yet been implemented in practice. The
Indian government is also reportedly exploring the compensatory
liability approach as one of several options, while otherwise resisting
138
data exclusivity in ongoing negotiations with USTR.
If the Indian
Government eventually threw its weight behind this compromise
139
approach, it might inspire other Asian governments to follow its lead.
For this reason, it is worth exploring further how such an option might
be implemented in practice.
2. Implementing a Compensatory Liability Regime
140

Acting on this author’s previous proposals, Robert Weissman and
141
James Love began working on more detailed implementing strategies.
As Weissman convincingly argued, developing countries are finding that
the misappropriation approach is not a viable negotiating posture,
despite its solid grounding in the TRIPS text and legislative history. “In
contrast, the cost-sharing approach can give developing countries
something to offer that may undercut demands for data exclusivity by
addressing the underlying basis for any claims to reward brand name
142
companies for conducting clinical tests.”
Moreover, by counter-offering with a liability rule, developing
national legislation applicants to rely on such data if the first applicant is adequately
compensated.
Id. (emphasis added). EFTA has reportedly made this option a standard practice in their
FTA negotiations. See ICTSD/UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 103.
138. However, such an option does not appear in SATWANT REDDY & GURDIAL
SINGH SANDHU, REPORT ON STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN THE
CONTEXT OF DATA PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 39.3 OF TRIPS AGREEMENT,
INDIA MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS AND FERTILIZERS (MAY 31, 2007). According to the
Government of India, “[t]he Department of Health & Family Welfare would give wide
publicity to the recommendations in the Report and carry out consultations with stakeholders
before proposing appropriate amendments to Drugs & Cosmetics Act 1940 and its Rules.”
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF CHEMICALS & FERTILIZERS, DEPT. OF CHEMICALS
AND
PETROCHEMICALS ANNUAL REPORT, 2007-2008 §2.44(c), available at
http://chemicals.nic.in/AREng0708.pdf.
Nonetheless, India continues to resist data
exclusivity as of April 2008. See, USTR pushes for drug data protection, THE TIMES OF
INDIA, April 15, 2008.
139. See generally, Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First
Century: Will Asia Lead or Follow?, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Changing
Role of Intellectual Property in Asia: Moving Beyond Producers and Consumers, University
of Illinois (March 1, 2008).
140. See supra notes 130 & 132.
141. Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130; Judit Rius Sanjuan, James
Love & Robert Weissman, A Cost-Sharing Model to Protect Investments in Pharmaceutical
Test Data, CPTech Pol’y Brief No. 1, April 3, 2006 (rev. ed., May 18, 2006).
142. Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130.
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country negotiators could leverage the fact that U.S. law already
establishes a version of this cost-sharing approach for agricultural
chemical compound registration, under the Federal Insecticide,
143
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).
Under this regime, as
explained by Weissman, “[a]fter the expiration of an exclusivity period,
generic entrants [would] have an automatic right to use registration
data. Disputes over compensation will not delay generic entrance and
144
are resolved while generic firms are on the market.”
Consistent with these premises, Weissman suggests language to
145
implement a “cost-sharing approach.”
His method quite literally
focuses on the actual cost of producing the data, usually in Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) markets,
where the data originator seeks first marketing approval. The amount
to be paid an originator company would result from evidence of (1) the
verifiable costs of the tests or data, (2) “a reasonable estimate of the
country’s likely share of the global market,” and (3) “the amount of
global revenue the product has generated to date, and in the previous 12
146
months.”
Actual costs may also reflect a risk premium to cover
possible failures in initial testing over time and some compensation for
the benefit of early market entry (as compared to the amount of time
147
needed in case of independent replication of clinical trials).
Weissman’s approach would thus seek to determine the
proportionate global market share to be allocated to generic
competitors on the basis of market size. One problem with it is the risk
143. This Act states:
The [Environmental Protection Agency] administrator, without the permission of
the original data submitter, [may] consider any item of data [cited] in support of an
application by another person . . . if the applicant has made an offer to compensate
the original data submitter. . . . [T]he terms and amount of compensation may be
fixed by an agreement between the original data submitter and the applicant, or
failing such an agreement, binding arbitration.
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii), supra note 45. But note that liability for equitable
compensation can only occur in the five years after the original ten-year period of complete
exclusivity of § 136a(c)(1)(F)(i) (which can be extended to thirteen years total under §
136a(c)(1)(F)(ii)).
144. See Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130, at 151-78; cf. Reichman,
Of Green Tulips, supra note 132.
145. See id., at 162-63. Weissman’s proposals would deny compensation for use of data
pertaining to products covered by patents and they impose an upper limit on the multiple of
actual costs that originators may recoup. Weissman also acknowledges that, under FIFRA,
U.S. arbitrators are willing to consider a “risk premium” to reflect the costs of testing that
result in unapproved products. See id. at 157, Box 9.2.
146. Sanjuan, Love & Weissman, supra note 141, at 8-9.
147. See ICTSD/UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 103, § 3.3.2, at 538.
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of overcompensation, although this factor itself depends on whether one
views the demand for payment as merely a form of compensation for
lost revenue or, alternatively, as a form of regulatory reward over and
148
above the patent system. Viewed as compensation for lost revenues,
Weissman proposes caps on the aggregate amount of revenue to be
recovered, and he would disallow any compensation at all if the
originator company held a valid patent on the product in the relevant
territory. In other words, Weissman sees compensation as a viable
claim only when, for one reason or another, the originator company had
149
failed to obtain a relevant patent in the country at issue.
One may doubt that negotiators in developing countries could
actually obtain such caps, in part because originator companies may
already receive double compensation in the European Union and the
United States (depending on the circumstances), in which case they
would be recognizing an inconsistent principle abroad. Moreover,
Weissman’s approach, based on market size, does not directly assess the
relative capacity to pay of the country in question.
Since Weissman’s initial proposals in 2003, Professor Aaron
Fellmeth has devised an elegant but still more complicated set of
150
“fairness” formulas drawing on the law and economics literature.
Fellmeth analyzes several different models, including a “Simple
Divisions Royalties Model” and a more refined “Re-adjustable
Royalties Model.” The latter takes into account such factors as the
initial costs of R&D, the time value of money, the number of
participants in the scheme, and their ability to pay.
One problem with both of these approaches is that determining the
true costs of pharmaceutical R&D for any purpose, especially drug price
appraisals or negotiations, has proved a daunting task never
151
satisfactorily resolved to date.
A fortiori, developing countries’
authorities would face major difficulties in determining R&D costs
accruing on the part of the data originator. Even if this variable were
established with some degree of credibility, it would remain nearly

148. See supra note 49; infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing views of Prof.
Rebecca Eisenberg).
149. Weissman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130, at 157. Even this approach
begs the question of how much “compensation” or “reward” had been obtained in other
countries.
150. See Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 478-500.
151. For a noteworthy illustration of the difficulties by an OECD task force, see
OECD, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET (2008) (Executive
Summary), available at http://www.oecd.org.
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impossible to determine how much of the expenses attributable to data
incurred by the originator company had in fact been recouped or
exceeded in developed country markets.
For this reason, a simpler approach may prove more desirable, if
only to avoid litigation and other transaction costs. On this approach, a
reasonable royalty model could be adopted instead, which would oblige
generic producers to pay a flat percentage of gross sales, or a flat
percentage above marginal costs of production, as a tithe for the right to
rely on the originators’ test data results for a specified period of time, to
last no longer than five years. On this approach, the compensation to be
paid is linked to the value of the data to each company, as reflected in
152
the resulting sales. Given that Canada used to impose a standard four
percent royalty on a license of right to use patented pharmaceuticals
153
until 1992, one could envision that figure as an outer limit, one that
also indirectly takes account of the fact that many originator companies
will already have recouped the bulk of their R&D expenses in
developed countries anyway. However, if relative ability to pay were
factored in, as would be desirable, the reasonable royalties could range
from, say, one to four percent, depending on where a given country fell
in the per capita GDP poverty index.
The principal disadvantage of this approach is that it would give only
an approximation of the originator’s true R&D costs. For that and
154
other reasons, it could be seen as “overcompensation,” all the more
so in that revenues obtained in developed markets are pocketed without
regard to these accounts. However, intellectual property law is
accustomed to such approximations, which in this case have the twin
virtues of avoiding the quixotic hunt for “true” costs (and the related
litigation costs certain to ensue) and of finessing the conceptual debate
about “rewards” versus “compensation,” to be examined below.
152. Sanjuan, Love & Weissman, supra note 141, at 7, 9, have also endorsed this
scheme in the alternative. They note that some FIFRA arbitrators have used this approach in
connection with agricultural test data. Id. at 7 (noting possible adjustments for risk of
investment and cost of capital). See also In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Microgen,
Inc. and Lonza, Inc., Arbitrator’s Decision and Award, Docket No.: 23-171-00003-96, Before
the American Arbitration Association, May 10, 2000.
153. See JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON–VOLUNTARY
LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (ICTSD, Geneva,
October
2002),
available
at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/prs/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf. This figure rose to six
percent in some cases decided in the 1990s.
154. Sanjuan, Love & Weissman, supra note 141, at 9, also suggest a royalty based on
four percent of net sales of the generic product as a baseline indicator, if this alternative were
adopted.
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Suffice it to say that, in a world where private pharmaceutical
companies continue to labor under the duty to supply clinical test data
as a de facto public good, their efforts to coerce generic competitors to
share that burden against their will are probably more efficiently
discharged by a simple liability rule based on a reasonable royalty than
by a true cost-sharing formula. The deeper questions concern the need
to rationalize the process by which this essential public good is to be
produced in the first place, a topic that this Article will soon address in
depth.
II. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF CLINICAL TRIAL DATA REGIMES
A. The Flawed Logic of Marketing Exclusivity
The foregoing discussion shows that “marketing exclusivity” (as the
protection of clinical test data is called in the United States) or “data
155
exclusivity” (as it is labeled in the European Union) has become an
increasingly accepted alternative to patents. While there has been
considerable discussion in both the United States and the European
Union about the modalities of implementing this de facto sui generis
intellectual property regime and about the benefits of transnational
harmonization of these modalities, there has been relatively little deep
analysis of the logic, nature, or validity of the regime itself, as an
156
institution of domestic and global intellectual property law.
1. Evaluating the Incentive Rationale
Partly, this inattention to fundamentals may stem from the
regulatory nature of the regime in the United States, which to some
extent has shielded it from the more intense public scrutiny likely to
accompany intellectual property bills that must wend their way through
157
congressional committees.
While considerable public debate was
generated in the European Union when the initial EC Directive of 1986
158
was replaced with a revised and consolidated Directive of 2001, this
155. Junod, supra note 9, at 502.
156. For efforts to raise awareness of the relevant issues, see Scafidi, supra note 23, and
Timmermans, supra note 11. See also Taubman, supra note 30.
157. However, recent proposals to extend long-term data exclusivity to biologics have
generated intense public debate. See, e.g., Jessica R. Underwood, What the EU Has That the
U.S. Wants: An Analysis of Potential Regulatory Systems for Follow-On Biologics in the
United States, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 419, 441-51 (2007).
158. Council Directive 87/21, 1987 O.J. (L 015) 36-37 (EC), amending Council
Directive 65/65, 1965 O.J. (L 22) 369 (EC); Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community Code relating to Medicinal
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debate seems to have largely focused on implementation issues in
regard to efforts that attempted to rationalize problems arising in the
159
past. The European Commission’s revised Directive of 2004 expressly
aimed to increase incentives to offset the competitive decline of the EU
pharmaceutical sector with respect to the U.S. sector at the turn of the
160
century.
In the absence of searching economic, philosophic, or
161
systematic legal analysis, at least until recently, the discussion has
often taken the largely unelaborated need for an additional incentive
mechanism for granted. Over time, this “need” has acquired an aura of
inevitability as the institution itself spreads from country to country and
162
region to region under the auspices of FTAs, with the diabolical
163
multiplier effect of the TRIPS Agreement’s MFN provision.
Congress originally justified the introduction of marketing
exclusivity as a device for encouraging “the development and testing of
164
unpatentable pharmaceuticals.”
Among the concerns known at the
time were the uncertain status of biotechnological inventions and
second uses of patented medicines (i.e., new therapeutic indications of
known compounds), both of which categories subsequently obtained a
165
more solid status in U.S. and EU patent law.
Over time, this
Products for Human Use, OJ EC, 28 Nov., L311/67.
159. Junod, supra note 9, at 502-17.
160. Directive 2004/27/EC, supra note 46, art. 10; Pugatch, NEGOTIATING HEALTH,
supra note 10, at 105-08 (describing “8+2+1 formula” of the current regulation, also including
a Bolar-type provision allowing experimental reverse-engineering of the patented molecule
for purposes of marketing approval before expiry of the patent).
161. For a critical analysis, see, e.g., Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 46; Reichman, NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 23. For a
profound enquiry that recognizes the many different and contradictory interests at stake, see
Taubman, supra note 30. For a favorable analysis on economic grounds, see, e.g., Fellmeth,
supra note 130, and Rebecca Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007). But see Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons:
Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1
(2007). See also Skillington & Solovy, supra note 20.
162. See, e.g., Taubman, supra note 30, at 601-04.
163. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 4 (no exception for regional trade
agreements as under GATT).
164. See Allergan Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1048 (2003) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 29 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48).
165. Junod, supra note 9, at 484-86. However, the systematization of biotechnology in
European patent law took much longer than in the United States and was not settled until the
Biotech Directive of 1998. See Council Directive 98/44, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13-21 (EC).
Presumably, data exclusivity helped fill this gap in the European Union. As for second uses,
see Richard F. Kingham & Grant H. Castle, Data and Marketing Exclusivity for
Pharmaceuticals in the European Community, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 209, 223 (2000) on this
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“supplementary incentive” rationale has been applied to
pharmaceuticals whose effective patent life was shortened by lengthy
166
167
delays for regulatory approval, to so-called orphan drugs, and most
recently, to biologics (large-molecule biogenetic pharmaceuticals),
which may require protracted and risky clinical trials and whose
suitability for bioequivalent generic manufacturing remains
168
controversial.
Marketing exclusivity as a provider of substitute compensation for
undertaking the costs and risks of clinical trials has also been used to
justify tough FTA provisions affecting the developing countries, where
many existing pharmaceutical patents were not yet recognized under the
169
TRIPS Agreement for one reason or another. This reasoning echoes
one of the early justifications in the European Union, when some
member countries—such as Spain and Portugal—did not grant
170
pharmaceutical patents at all. But these justifications appear weak in
that all countries (except a few Least-Developed Countries) must now
171
protect pharmaceutical inventions (created after 2005 at the latest);
while the notion that the European Commission and Council should
supplement national public health schemes premised on price controls
by imposing data exclusivity provisions raises both constitutional
questions and concerns about regulatory capture that lie beyond the
scope of this Article.
Viewed as a gap-filling alternative to patents rooted in the incentive
rationale, the data exclusivity regimes reveal a number of internal
contradictions that critics have pointed out. For example, the inability
to patent any given pharmaceutical may indicate relatively low public
point.
166. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 351-59.
167. See Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 458-59.
168. Grabowski, Data Exclusivity, supra note 54; Abbott, NEGOTIATING HEALTH,
supra note 105.
169. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 70 (no retroactivity; no pipeline; only a
mailbox for new patents during transitional phase; plus a market exclusivity requirement for
patents in the mailbox unrelated to clinical test data). See also Taubman, supra note 30, at
596 (stressing free-rider problem), 597-98 (contrasting developing countries’ demands for
protection of traditional knowledge with their denial of claims for “misappropriation” of
clinical test data).
170. Junod, supra note 9, at 502 (citing James Love, TACD on Pharmaceutical
Registration
Data
Exclusivity
(Draft),
available
at
http://www.essentialdrugs.org/edrug/archive/200001/msg00075.php).
171. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, arts. 27, 65.1, 65.4, 66.1 (plus later extensions),
70; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59, at 928-29, 975-76, 976 n.239 (noting exemption of
LDCs from duty to provide patent protection of pharmaceuticals until 1 January 2016).
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health utility, as when minor improvements are made to an existing
patent, often as an excuse to prolong or “evergreen” that same patented
172
product.
More generally, the number of unpatented products
attracting data exclusivity at any given time seems relatively small in
relation to the total number of products—patented or not—that are
173
similarly protected. As a result, so much double compensation seems
built into a sui generis right that applies across the board to both
patented and unpatented medicines that, even if one buys into the
174
notion that two conceptually distinct incentives are at issue, it tends to
obviate the validity of the distinction in practice.
However, these arguments are not necessarily conclusive. Some
incremental improvements may elicit big therapeutic benefits without
attracting patent protection in some jurisdictions, especially those that
resist product patents for new uses of known substances. Conversely,
even new chemical entities that do meet patentability standards may
yield relatively minor advances in therapeutic benefits. To the extent
that a marketing exclusivity regime provides needed incentives at all—
admittedly a serious question—it could validly perform that function in
certain cases, especially if the relation to patent duration were
175
“capped,” as was permitted under the first EC Directive, or if the
176
short term of duration—five years in the United States —made it
unlikely to extend beyond the term of patent protection, where it exists,
in most cases.
In this same vein, one must also factor in the potential social costs of
the drive for so-called “quality patents,” which seems likely to elevate
the very low nonobviousness standard in the United States during the
1990s to higher, more stringent levels, especially after the Supreme
177
Court’s recent decision in the KSR case of 2007.
To the extent that
more incremental improvements to existing pharmaceuticals were
denied patents on grounds of obviousness in the future, the marketing
172. Junod, supra note 9, at 495.
173. See, e.g., id., at 487-88. In the period 1998 to February 2004, 27 out of 137 FDA
approved drugs were developed without “substantial patent protection.” Id. at 487.
174. See, e.g., Taubman, supra note 30.
175. Council Directive 87/21, supra note 158, discussed in Junod, supra note 9, at 503.
176. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 355(3)(E)(ii), 355(5)(F)(ii) (2008).
177. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007). “[A]s progress beginning
from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of ordinary
innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it otherwise
patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.” Id. at 1746. See
Symposium, Nonobviousness—The Shape of Things to Come, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
323 (2008).
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exclusivity regime for clinical trials could increasingly supply the sole
incentives for overcoming the risk of market failure for an everwidening class of pharmaceuticals that, in the past, had sometimes
proved to yield surprising therapeutic benefits. Occasionally, indeed, it
is the second or third variation on a common medical theme that gets it
178
right from the standpoint of optimal delivery.
Absent alternative
incentives, this type of innovation could become progressively less
attractive to venture capital under a more rigorous nonobvious
179
standard. Moreover, according to Professor Henry Grabowski, the
long incubation period for biologics, and the corresponding risk of
Phase III clinical test failures, puts the breakeven point so high that
investors want Congress to deliberately extend market exclusivity
beyond effective patent life as an inducement to risk averse venture
180
capitalists (although this camp conveniently omits any mention of the
government funds pouring into this same field).
My point is that the incentive rationale for market exclusivity,
although usually overstated in its conventional form, has just enough
legs or legitimacy in enough circumstances that it must be addressed
head on, and not entirely dismissed out of hand as an irrelevant
appendage to the patent system. Recently, moreover, the incentive
rationale has been given a new twist by a distinguished authority that
arguably reinforces any legitimacy it otherwise possessed. Professor
Rebecca Eisenberg argues that market exclusivity is part of an
interrelated group of regulatory provisions that not only force drug
companies to conduct clinical trials and submit results to independent
experts, they positively stimulate producers to conduct more and better
trials than they otherwise would be inclined to do, which redounds to
181
the benefit of the overall innovation process.
Like Professor
Grabowski in regard to biologics, Professor Eisenberg thus sees value in
strengthening the incentives that flow from data exclusivity, as distinct
from patents, to improve the quality of clinical trials. But she would
178. For example, see Genentech’s patent application in Europe for “the intermittent
administration of insulin-like growth factor (IGF) I to avoid tachyphylaxis (rapid loss of drug
efficacy with continued use) during the treatment of a chronic disease[.]” Mary Ann Liebert,
Genentech’s Method of Using Growth Factor May Be Patentable in Europe, 25 BIOTECH. L.
REP. 18 (2006).
179. See Grabowski, Data Exclusivity, supra note 54.
180. Id. See also Henry Grabowski, David Ridley & Kevin Schulman, Entry and
Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGE. DECIS. ECON. 439, 440 (2007). But the extent
to which the costs of trials for biologics greatly exceed that of small molecules has not been
conclusively established.
181. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 366-87.
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impose the condition that these extra benefits must also result in much
greater disclosure and transparency with regard to clinical test results
than currently occurs, which, in her view, could greatly reduce the
182
aggregate costs of conducting clinical trials.
Needless to say, there are more problems with these arguments than
we have space to address here. For example, Ariel Katz suggests that
positive clinical trial results already perform such a crucial
“certification” guarantee against “lemons” that pharmaceutical
companies ought to be grateful for the opportunity to shoulder the
183
costs, heavy as they may be.
More tellingly, the apologists for
marketing exclusivity seldom mention the almost thirty billion dollars a
184
year of federal funds that the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”)
spend on upstream research in order to reduce the enormous risks
185
inherent in early stage medical research. Because this federal funding
policy often leaves only the downstream research burdens to the
pharmaceutical companies, especially the so-called “billion dollar
186
barrier” of clinical trials, it is largely the costs of clinical trials that
justifies strong pharmaceutical patents—and correspondingly high
pharmaceutical prices—in the first place.
Given that the originator pharmaceutical companies themselves
never cease reminding us of this fact when justifying the benefits of
existing patent law against reforms desired by other industries,
187
especially the information technology sector, arguments that focus on
the need for ever greater incentives for clinical trials as such often have
a hollow ring to them. They enable the originator companies to have it
both ways, without accounting for the excess profits that overlapping
regimes can yield in many, if not most cases.
182. Id. at 380-85; see most recently, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Public Health:
The Significance of Data Exclusivity, paper presented to the Workshop on Trade Secrecy,
Conference of the Engelberg Center on Innovation, Law and Policy, NYU Law School
(February 20-21, 2009).
183. Katz, supra note 161.
184. Health Issues and Opportunities at NIH: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. Labor,
Health and Human Services, Education Appropriations (2008) (testimony of Elias A.
Zerhouni, M.D., Director, NIH), available at http://appropriations.senate.gov//2008_07_16_Labor-_Testimony_of_Dr_Elias_ A_Zerhouni _at_the_July_16_NIH_Hearing.pdf.
185. See, e.g., Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44, at 4.
186. DiMasi et al., supra note 5, at 181 (“Assuming the same growth rates . . . per
approved drug for R&D relevant to approvals in 2001 . . . capitalized pre-approval cost would
be US$ 1.1 billion.”).
187. Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral
Patent Standards with Regulation of End Product Therapeutics, forthcoming in the HOUSTON
L. REV., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160198.
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Nevertheless, to the extent that the incentive rationale for data
exclusivity has some legs or legitimacy in at least a narrow range of
cases, it gives rise to two fundamental questions. First, is a sui generis
exclusive property right the proper way to provide the kind of
additional incentives said to be needed? A second and more profound
question is, if clinical trials are such an essential public good that we
must scrape the bottom of the intellectual property barrel to stimulate
the private sector to provide it adequately, why do we insist on charging
that sector with this task in the first place?
2. Why a Sui Generis Exclusive Property Right?
However strong or weak the case for an incentive rationale to justify
clinical data generation may be, policymakers take a big leap of faith
when they uncritically seek to address this need by means of a sui
generis exclusive property right. Historically, such regimes have
compiled a dismal record as legislators shift between copyright-like and
188
patent-like regimes over time.
These hybrid regimes typically
generate unintended effects of under or over protection without ever
satisfactorily resolving the underlying problems of market failure.
Conceptually, moreover, patent-like sui generis regimes inevitably
harbor irresolvable economic contradictions with the mature patent
189
paradigm, which never go away.
Consider that the patent law allows an invention to escape the
discipline of free competition only because the inventor has contributed
a new and useful technical achievement that routine engineers operating
190
in the relevant field could not themselves have developed.
By
disclosing such an invention to the public in return for a legal monopoly,
the inventor helps to elevate the existing state of competition to its next
188. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Symposium, Design Protection and the New
Technologies: The United States Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L.
REV. 6 (1990); Jerome H. Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A
Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. USA 267 (1984);
Jerome H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the
Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143.
189. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Symposium, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal
Hybrids]; Jerome H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 475 (1995); Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151
(1999).
190. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007); Wal-Mart Stores v.
Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964)
and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (Sears-Compco Doctrine).
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191

highest level.
Given these premises, however, the practice of
extending patent-like exclusive rights, with all the social costs they
entail, to “sweat of the brow” research results that fail the test of
192
nonobviousness will not withstand either logical or economic analysis.
However important their public health functions certainly are,
clinical trial results merely improve upon existing technological knowhow, without adding an inventive step to the prior art. The sui generis
intellectual property right in question thus protects investment as such,
not a technological achievement. Using exclusive property rights that
block second comers for this purpose blurs the boundaries between
193
194
rights holders and risks generating exorbitant social costs, unless
there is no other way to attain the desired public health goals of safety
and efficacy.
To avoid these conceptual errors, I have long urged policymakers to
sharpen the distinction between exclusive rights that aim to stimulate
technological progress and alternative measures that aim to protect
195
investments as such. This distinction is particularly important in cases
where second comers may too easily capture the fruits of investment by
avoiding or circumventing the cost structure that legitimate competitors
196
must otherwise defray.
In such cases, addressing the risk of
diminished investment by first movers ideally calls for a pro-competitive

191. See Michael Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property--Property Rights as
Restrictions on Competition in Furtherance of Competition, 20 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT L. 1 (1989).
192. Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 132, at 1755 (discussing problem of
cumulative and sequential innovation).
193. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 88-89 (Princeton Univ.
Press 2008); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEXAS L. REV. 989 (1997); Reichman & Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus,
supra note 91, at 102-22.
194. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (Basic Books
2008). Cf. also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
195. See, e.g., Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 189; Reichman, Of Green Tulips,
supra note 132.
196. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights
in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Jerome H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Global
Economy, 2002 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE 455-504; Pamela
Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor, & Jerome H. Reichman, A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994). See
also Leo Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual
Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991).
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remedy that compensates for the losses from undisciplined free-riding
without creating barriers to entry for second comers willing to recognize
the first comer’s contribution when themselves investing in follow-on
197
activities.
By focusing attention on the need to protect investment, rather than
on stimulating a particular level of technical achievement, policymakers
concerned about market failures would logically weigh the relative costs
198
199
and benefits of liability rules, that is “take now and pay later” rules,
200
against those of sui generis exclusive property regimes. In this vein, I
have elsewhere proposed a “compensatory liability regime” that would
allow the first innovator a short period of immunity from wholesale
duplication, followed by a brief but relatively longer period in which
follow-on improvers could freely enter the market by paying a
reasonable royalty to the first comer in exchange for the privilege of
201
adding onto his or her initial contribution.
In such cases, one may
view the second comer’s compensatory royalties either as a pro rata
contribution to the first comer’s costs or as the product of a de facto
partnership between the innovator, who took the first investment risk,
and the second comer, who improves upon the former’s technical
202
outcome.
197. This, of course, was the logic of traditional trade secret law itself, which conferred
only “take and pay” remedies in the sense that those who misappropriated another’s secret
know-how by dishonest means had to repay the saved costs of reverse engineering by honest
means. See RESTATEMENT (3D) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 45 (1995); Reichman, Legal
Hybrids, supra note 189; Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics
of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
198. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 132.
199. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1996).
200. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 84-97 (2007)
(“Blue Skies” Scenario), available at http://www.epo.org /topics/patent-system/scenarios-forthe-future.html.
201. See Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 132. See also Jerome H. Reichman &
Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries:
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337-66
(Keith Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Jerome H. Reichman, Saving the Patent
System from Itself, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289-304 (F. Scott
Kieff, ed., 2003).
202. Liability rules also look particularly attractive in certain pre-competitive
situations, where efforts are made to pool resources for basic upstream scientific research
without forfeiting opportunities for financial gain through posterior but unforeseen
commercial applications. See, e.g., Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note
44; Jerome H. Reichman, Tom Daederwerdere & Paul F. Uhlir, Designing the Microbial
Commons, Conference on the Microbial Commons, University of Ghent, 2008; Jerome H.
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The application of these principles to clinical trial data seems
particularly compelling, given that we are dealing with regulatory
outcomes that may become secondary barriers to the marketing of
203
pharmaceutical inventions that were developed in response to the
prospects of downstream exclusive rights in the form of patents.
Typically, these inventions were also a product of upstream government
204
funding in the form of university research grants.
With regard to
clinical test data, in other words, the issue is not how to stimulate
further technical innovation at all—it is how to protect the inventor’s
downstream investment in the enormous costs and risks of conducting
clinical trials that must meet ever more stringent standards of public
health and safety.
If it could be empirically demonstrated that the costs and risks of
clinical trials—minus the benefits that accrue from a product patent, if
205
any, and from the ensuing certification against “lemons” —failed to
provide originator pharmaceutical companies with a sufficient return on
investment, the proper remedy would surely not be to add yet another
exclusive property right to the mix, with all its attendant social costs for
both innovation and consumers. Rather, the logical solution is to
directly address the risks of diminished investment by allowing generic
competitors who lawfully enter the market (after any lawful patents
expire) to share the costs of these same trials for a relatively short
period of time, without erecting new barriers to entry or otherwise
delaying the price reductions to patients that competition automatically
tends to generate.
At times, the originator company may develop improvements or
second uses for which no patent becomes available, especially after the
Supreme Court’s tightened nonobvious standards filter through the
206
system.
Assuming that the product in question delivered real
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific
Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
315 (2003). For a relevant and revealing economic analysis, see generally Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 917 (2005).
203. See Taubman, supra note 30, at 601.
204. Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 465, 467
(2005) (“The few innovative drugs usually stem from publicly-funded research done at
government or university labs.”).
205. Katz, supra note 161.
206. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); Nonobviousness—The
Shape of Things to Come, supra note 177. For pre-KSR likelihood, see Junod, supra note 9,
at 486 (“The impression left . . . is that patents are so easy to obtain that marketing exclusivity
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therapeutic benefits, the protection of investment in clinical trials might
afford the only incentive available and the sole remedy for an incipient
207
market failure.
But even in these cases, which appear to have been
208
relatively rare in the past, there is no reason to reward the investor
with the very patent-like monopoly he failed to achieve on the merits.
The most that a market failure due to the risks of a second comer’s
ability to rely on the innovator’s prior regulatory approval could
logically justify is a cost-sharing tax on competitors (and consumers) in
209
the form of a liability rule along the lines described above.
These premises apply with even greater force to the originator
pharmaceutical companies’ demands for sui generis data exclusivity
rights in developing countries under the aegis of bilateral and regional
210
FTAs that have mushroomed in the post-TRIPS era.
Given that
originator pharmaceutical companies will have recouped their
investments and made their profits by charging high prices in developed
countries, it is hard to justify any further protection of investments in
211
R&D beyond territorial patents in the developing countries. Because
in these countries there is “a large pool of unpatented pharmaceutical
products,” data exclusivity can “become a partial substitute for patent
212
protection.” But there is nothing “unfair” in allowing second comers
213
If the
to exploit the goodwill accruing to unpatented products.
regulatory authorities in developing countries allow generic producers
to rely on bioequivalence with products approved elsewhere (a reliance
rooted in both foreign regulatory outcomes and the relevant scientific

is not necessary. . . . [A] firm can get not one, but several, twenty-year patents for all aspects
of its drug, without—at least in practice—being unduly encumbered by the nonobviousness
requirement.”).
207. Unless the government covered the costs of clinical trials in the first place, in
which case the unpatentable improvement should compete profitably on the open market if it
actually delivered therapeutic benefits. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
208. See Junod, supra note 9, at 485-86.
209. As previously noted, FIFRA already employs such a regime for pesticides, and
USTR initially proposed such a regime for article 39.3 of TRIPS. See, e.g., Fellmeth, supra
note 130, at 479-83.
210. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
211. But see Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 496 (rejecting data exclusivity as a de facto
attempt “to subsidize wealthy foreign drug developers” but accepting the view that generic
manufacturers in developing countries should “pay their fair share of the costs of using trade
secrets in their country”).
212. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 46, at 70.
213. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (Sears-Compco Doctrine); Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara
Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
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literature), it is hard to see why they should be charged anything at all
for the alleged “use” in their countries of so-called trade secrets that
214
they have never actually seen at all.
Nevertheless, to the extent that, rightly or wrongly, some protection
of clinical test data has become a nonnegotiable cost of doing business
under FTAs with the United States, developing country governments
should stand firm on counter proposals offering only a cost-sharing
215
liability rule and not an exclusive property right.
To this end,
Professor Aaron Fellmeth has lately published a still more refined
“Readjustable Royalties Model,” which factors the developing
216
countries’ ability to pay into the calculus of reasonable royalties.
Unfortunately, developing-country trade negotiators have not
generally adopted this cost-sharing approach, perhaps in the mistaken
belief that they could resist USTR’s pressures for data exclusivity on
other grounds. As a result, the intellectual property chapters in most
FTAs that have so far been concluded embody variations on the
217
exclusive property regimes previously described. It remains to be seen
whether Asian countries, such as Korea and India, which offer strong
market-access incentives of their own, will turn the tide by successfully
218
defending a liability rule in lieu of an exclusive property right.
Even that auspicious outcome, however, would not necessarily
provide an adequate solution to the questions posed at the outset of this
enquiry. To be sure, a liability rule would address any claims sounding
in the incentive and fairness rationales—whatever their validity might
219
be —without generating the subsidies, barriers to entry, and other
social costs attendant upon a data exclusivity regime. But such an
approach, still begs the second question posed earlier, namely, why
should the private sector be obliged to provide and pay for clinical test
data in the first place? It is to this fundamental question that we must
turn now, in the concluding section of Part II.

214. See, e.g., Timmermans, supra note 11, at 206 (arguing that “while . . . generic
manufacturers indirectly rely on the originator’s safety and efficacy data,” they “do not use
the originator’s data—in fact they do not even have access to them”); Bayer, Inc. v. Canada,1
F.C. 553, T-1154-97. But see Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 496.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 140-54 (discussing proposals by Reichman,
Weissman, Love, and others).
216. Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 482-96.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 108-20.
218. Maskus & Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods, supra note
97, at 14.
219. See, e.g., Taubman, supra note 30.
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B. From Private to Public Goods: The Most Logical Reform
At the outset, this Article evidenced the soaring costs of clinical
trials in the United States, which a well-known study estimated as high
as one billion dollars per approved new chemical entity (when adjusted
220
for the four out of five failure rate currently reported). Since then, the
questions on the table have been whether, in order to recoup these
costs, the originator pharmaceutical companies should be entitled to a
second revenue stream from a sui generis data exclusivity right, in
addition to patents, and if so, the extent to which international
intellectual property law should recognize a similar right under either
the TRIPS Agreement or the proliferating FTAs that have succeeded it.
Now, instead, it is time to step back and ask what might be
fundamentally wrong with this entire picture.
American consumers already pay the highest prices in the world for
patented pharmaceuticals largely because they are routinely told they
must cover the soaring costs of pharmaceutical research and
221
development. Because the NIH and the Department of Energy alone
spend more than thirty billion dollars a year to defray the costs of basic
222
research in nonprofit institutions, it follows that the bulk of the costs
chargeable to American consumers must pertain to clinical trials
223
Why, then,
conducted to meet public health and safety regulations.
are the results of these trials increasingly untrustworthy, distorted, or
224
outright fraudulent? And why, if American consumers must cover the
high costs of clinical trials, are much poorer consumers in developing
countries increasingly denied affordable medicines—including offpatent generics—on the grounds that, they, too, must help defray the
225
burgeoning costs of the same increasingly unreliable clinical trials?
My thesis is that the drive to protect clinical trial data internationally
is but the latest and most far-reaching consequence of the deep
structural problems that flow from the failure to treat clinical trials as a
226
national and international public good.
So long as this market220. DiMasi et al., supra note 5.
221. See, e.g., Angell, supra note 204.
222. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19; Grabowski, Data
Exclusivity, supra note 54.
224. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the
Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623 (2007); Angell, supra note 204, at 466-67; supra notes
1-3 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, supra note 117, at 83.
226. See Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32.
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distorting anomaly persists, clinical data as a guarantor of public safety
will remain undersupplied, the scientific benefits of such trials will be
impeded, and the drive to keep secret the very data that logically
require the highest degree of transparency will produce rippling
legislative distortions and high social costs that now take the form of
pseudo-intellectual property rights.
In what follows, I describe a proposal to treat clinical trials as a
public good that was jointly developed by Professors Tracy Lewis,
227
Anthony So, and myself. Our approach would provide a longer-term
solution to a deep structural problem in national and international drug
supply chains by rationalizing the treatment of clinical trials from a
political economic perspective. It would also eliminate both the risk of
free-riding on private sector R&D and the need for secrecy or de facto
intellectual property protection of the resulting data.
1. Public Disclosure: Only the First Step in a Broader Reform
Recent revelations about the suppression of adverse findings in the
clinical testing of new medicines pending FDA approval have led many
228
to call for mandatory disclosure of all clinical trial results.
As
previously noted, Professor Eisenberg would craft the data exclusivity
right so as to provide pharmaceutical companies additional incentives to
conduct better quality trials in exchange for public disclosure of the
229
results.
These proposals move in the right direction towards
227. Part II.B of this article is largely based on two versions of an earlier article, one
published and another unpublished longer version. For the short, published version, see
Lewis et. al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32. The longer version, with revisions
and updates, is substantially reproduced here for the first time. See also Dean Baker, The
Benefits and Savings from Publicly-Funded Clinical Trials of Prescription Drugs, Center for
Economic and Policy Research (March 2008), available at http://www.cepr.net (a “paper . . . in
large part inspired by . . . [the] plan” set out in Lewis, Reichman, & So, The Case for Public
Funding, (2007)).
228. See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay, The Changing Economics of Clinical Development,
Paper Presented at the Program on Science, Technology, and Global Science, The Earth Inst.
at Columbia Univ. (May 20, 2004); Press Release, AMA, AMA recommends that DHHS
establish a registry for all US clinical trials (June 15, 2004), http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/article/1616-8651.html; Press Release, American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry & American Psychiatric Association, Leading Medical Groups
Endorse
Public
Clinical
Trials
Registry
(Sept.
9,
2004),
http://www.aacap.org/press_releases/2004/0909.htm. See also Senators Introduce Legislation
That Would Establish Clinical Trial Registry Database, MEDILEXICON, Oct. 9, 2004,
http://www.pharma-lexicon.com/medicalnews.php?newsid=14711; Medical journals to require
SCIENTIST,
Sept.
9,
2004,
available
at
clinical
trial
registration,
NEW
http://www.newscientist.com /news/print.jsp?id=ns99996378.
229. Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 366-72.
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addressing the selective disclosure of pharmaceutical testing results,
230
However,
study design biases, and other questionable practices.
disclosure is not the main problem but rather a symptom of a much
deeper structural problem.
Mandatory disclosure without addressing this deeper problem yields
a less than optimal approach to rationalizing the regulatory machinery
governing the supply of pharmaceutical products. Requiring mandatory
disclosure of clinical trials will not eliminate the inherent conflict of
interest underlying the commercial provision of drugs and medicine or
the fundamental inefficiencies the current system promotes. So long as
drug companies retain primary responsibility for conducting or funding
clinical trials, they will be tempted to selectively disclose information
and to avoid research programs that could reveal unfavorable outcomes.
Nor would a disclosure requirement alone ensure that the stakeholding
company will conduct all the tests deemed most beneficial to public
231
safety.
For example, until the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
funded the Women’s Health Initiative, the risks and benefits of
postmenopausal hormone therapy remained inadequately assessed by
232
randomized clinical trial procedures despite its widespread use.
Equally troubling, drug company sponsors completed Phase IV clinical
trials necessary for upgrading to regular approval in only six of twenty233
three fast-track approvals of cancer drugs. There are few incentives to
undertake costly testing if the results might only serve to narrow use of
the drug to a smaller subgroup of patients or prove unfavorable to its
continued use.
A better alternative to calls for mandatory disclosure is to remove
230. See, e.g., Harris, Gardner. Spitzer Sues a Drug Maker, Saying It Hid Negative
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A1; Peter Juni et al., Risk of cardiovascular events and
LANCET,
Nov.
5,
2004,
rotecoxib:
Cumulative
meta-analysis,
THE
http://image.theLancet.com/extras/04art10237web.pdf. See also Dong BJ, Gambertoglio JG,
Gee L et al., Bioequivalence of Levothyroxine Preparations: Industry Sponsorship and
Academic Freedom, 277(15) JAMA 1200-01 (1997).
231. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32. See also Baker, supra
note 227, at 3 (citing Turner et al., 2008; Bodenheimer, 2000; Cho & Bero, 1996; among
others).
232. See, e.g., Writing Group for the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators, Risks
and Benefits of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal Results
From the Women’s Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 JAMA 321-33 (2002);
Lawrence M. Brass, Hormone Replacement Therapy and Stroke: Clinical Trials Review, 2004
STROKE 35.
233. Thomas G. Roberts, Jr. & Bruce A. Chabner, Beyond Fast Track for Drug
Approvals, 351(5) NEW ENG. J. MED. 501 (2004).
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the direct link between the test sponsor (the drug company) and the
drug testers. One approach would be to establish an independent
testing agency to conduct clinical trials under specified conditions of
transparency. Unlike the current system, drug companies would no
longer directly compensate the scientists evaluating their own products.
Instead, the scientists would now work for the testing agency, supported
234
by general funds collected from the pharmaceutical industry.
This
separation of clinical trials from sponsorship could attenuate the conflict
of interest problem, and it would better ensure objective processing with
full disclosure of results under the aegis of a national testing facility than
235
the current system.
Even if the competitive logistics of such an approach posed no
unsolvable problems, however, it would insufficiently rationalize the
drug supply and pricing process, and thus fail to realize the potential
236
benefits of treating clinical trials as a public good.
To this end, the
federal government, rather than the drug companies, should fund the
bulk of the costs of clinical trials. This thesis follows from a careful
examination of both the economics of drug supply as well as the political
economy of prescription drug programs at home and abroad, as
explained below.
2. The Case for Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good
At the outset, it seems clear that the information gleaned from the
clinical testing of drugs and therapies is a public good in the sense that
each individual citizen benefits from such information without reducing
237
its value to others. At the same time, the results of the testing process
reveal information that improves the conduct of R&D in the industry as
a whole without disturbing the validity of underlying patents that
234. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 1.
235. Cf., e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20(5)
HEALTH AFF. 136, 145-47 (2001) (suggesting creation of financially independent pharmacoeconomic research institutes to assess costs and benefits of new and existing drugs).
236. Cf., e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, An Information Infrastructure for the Pharmaceutical
Market, 23(2) HEALTH AFF. 107, 109 (2004) (stressing importance of treating information
about pharmaceutical effectiveness as a public good). In his 2004 article, Professor Reinhardt
proposed the creation of a publicly funded research organization to evaluate the cost
effectiveness of drugs and to disseminate the results. Id. Lewis, Reichman, and So believe
the public good rationale he expounds should be expanded to cover the production and
dissemination of clinical trial data as such. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra
note 32.
237. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 236, at 109 (stressing non-excludable and nonrivalrous character of “information that facilitates the proper functioning of a healthcare
market—such as that for drugs”). See also Taubman, supra note 30.
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238

protect the products and processes of innovative firms.
Like peer-reviewed basic research results, which have always been
recognized as a public good, peer-reviewed clinical trial results should
promote surer decisions about the safety and therapeutic value of both
single products and product groups while stimulating follow-on
innovation and providing guidance for better clinical practice. Yet,
despite these potential public benefits, our current system saddles
private companies with the burdens of clinical testing and thus renders
the results artificially scarce and excludable. This approach ignores
economic principles teaching that privately supplied public goods will
239
typically be underprovided. In this context, undersupply evokes cases
in which a head-to-head comparison between therapeutically equivalent
drugs was not studied; an adverse drug reaction was not explored; a
specified clinical indication was not appropriately narrowed; or the
240
possibility of use for a neglected disease was not pursued.
Those concerned that current clinical testing practices fail to meet
public health needs may nonetheless question a proposal for public
support of drug testing. The response is that the practice of shunting the
provision of such a crucial public good as clinical trials to the private
241
pharmaceutical sector has become unsustainable over time.
Rather
than continue this market distortion, the most rational reform is to shift
some portion of the cost of clinically testing new pharmaceutical
products to the public sector, with a view towards rationalizing the
supply chain for medicines and to lowering the prices of drugs to
consumers to levels more reasonably related to their actual R&D costs.
a. The Drug Companies’ Costs Would Decline with Government
Funding of Clinical Trials
The total direct cost of drug testing should fall with public funding,
oversight, and full disclosure of clinical trial results, especially of
unfavorable or negative results. Such a program would enable
investigators to exploit economies of scale and scope in testing, would
minimize unnecessary redundancies, and would allow researchers to
interpret and compare the results of different tests. Public disclosure of
trial results should further reduce research and development costs as
238. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 1-2.
239. See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 236, at 109 (stating that “the private sector
typically does not produce these [public information] goods in socially efficient quantities”).
240. On the orphan drugs question, see Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra
note 19, at 459-60.
241. See supra notes 33-44 and accompanying text.
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drug companies learn earlier which candidate medicines are
242
therapeutically effective and which are not.
Admittedly, some of the benefits from centralized clinical testing
could be achieved without public sponsorship. One could require drug
companies to pay for publicly supervised tests, and some cost savings
would still presumably occur. However, public support of drug testing
would provide additional dividends far exceeding the direct cost savings
from a privately funded program of clinical testing, as shown below.
b. Lower Drug Company Costs Would Benefit Consumers in the Short
Run
Drug companies’ costs of developing and marketing new medicines
should fall significantly with public funding of clinical trials and full
disclosure of the results. Recent studies show the growing importance
of these costs in determining the aggregate expense of bringing new
243
drugs to market, in a lottery-like environment where “most drug
244
candidates taken into testing fail.”
A reduction in the costs of supply and in the attendant risks of
investing in failed drugs would enable companies to reduce the prices of
successful new drugs while still earning a competitive return on
245
investment. Public funding of clinical tests would also provide more
transparent estimates of the total costs of drug supply, which would
allow health insurers to more accurately assess what revenues were
242. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 227.
243. See. e.g., Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 460 (stressing
increase of R&D costs at an annual rate of 7.4% above inflation compared to 1980s and
finding size and number of clinical trials “[a] major factor accounting for this growth in
costs”); DiMasi et al., supra note 5. These authors found:
We may approximate the increases in cost per subject over time by examining the
excess of medical care inflation over general price inflation. The medical care
component of the CPI increased at an average annual rate of 6.73% from 1984 to
1997, while general price inflation (applying the price index used to deflate costs for
this study) rose at an annual rate of 3.06% over the same period. Thus, other things
being equal, these results suggest an increase of 11.4% per year in clinical trial costs.
This compares to our finding of an 11.8% annual growth rate in out-of-pocket
clinical period cost between DiMasi et al. (1991) and the current study.
Id. at 177. See also Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory and Implementation of
Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 428 (Keith E.
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (R&D costs account for roughly 30% of total cost
of new drugs).
244. See. e.g., Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 460-61 (adding
that, of those that survive, only a few “succeed in generating very large returns”).
245. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 3.
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required for continued pharmaceutical innovation. Unlike programs for
capping drug prices that require a full accounting of all drug company
246
costs, this proposal would generate pressures on drug companies to
reduce prices only in proportion to the observed cost savings generated
247
by public funding and disclosure of clinical test results. These savings
would affect the costliest component of the entire downstream R&D
budget, and they would further reduce investment risks by building
upon the federal government’s already substantial funding of basic
research.
While health providers would benefit from the lower costs of
procuring prescription drugs, consumers are the primary beneficiaries of
this program. Many consumers cannot afford the monopoly prices
charged by patent protected drug manufacturers. A reduction in prices
due to lowered costs of clinical testing would allow low income and
248
uninsured patients greater access to medicines.
The well known
allocative distortions that arise from patent protected medicines would
be reduced to the extent that public support of clinical testing forced
drug prices to decline.
c. Long Run Efficiencies in Drug Discovery and Development
Analysts note with alarm that the overall rate of innovation for new
medicines and therapies appears to be slowing, while the gap between
249
R&D investment and output has widened.
Moreover, existing
projects do not routinely address socially important therapeutic needs,
as when firms decrease or abandon R&D opportunities pertaining to
antibacterial drugs despite evidence of mounting resistance to available
246. The difficulty of reliably establishing these costs is well established in the
literature. See. e.g., Baker, supra note 227.
247. For detailed mechanisms to reduce prices in relation to government funding of
clinical trials, see id.
248. Id. at 8-14. Under Baker’s figures,
the potential savings from the Medicare prescription drug program are large enough
by themselves to easily cover the expense of publicly financed clinical trials.
However, there could also be savings for state and local governments if the federal
government designed a system in which it also negotiated lower prices on the behalf
of other units of government.
Id. at 13.
249. See, e.g., Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44 (citing
Treating the poor health of the industry, IMS HEALTH, Sept. 29, 2004,
http://open.imshealth.com/IMSinclude/i_article_ 20040929.asp; Changing Patterns of
Pharmaceutical Innovation, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT
RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, May 2002, http://www.nihcm.org
/innovations.pdf).
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250

antibiotics.
Although there are multiple contributing factors to this
251
apparent slow down in pharmaceutical innovation, rationalizing the
clinical trial component of the drug supply chain would arguably
stimulate more productive R&D and more affordable end products.
(1) Stimulating More Investment in Innovative R&D with Lower Costs
and Better Information
Besides reducing the costs of clinical testing and greatly lessening
the private sector’s risks of developing drugs for clinical use, the
heightened transparency resulting from a public-good approach should–
as previously observed–enable private and public health care providers
252
to press companies to reduce their prices. A fall in prescription drug
prices would reduce the variable profit the company earned on existing
drug sales. As the unit profit from each additional sale declined, the
marginal incentives to market medications to increase sales might also
decrease, which could help to discourage wasteful expenditures on
253
marketing and promotion.
More importantly, if drug companies no longer had to defray the
250. Steven J. Projan, Why is big Pharma getting out of antibacterial drug discovery?, 6
CURRENT OPINION IN MICROBIOLOGY 427-30 (2003); Per Nordberg, Dominique L. Monnet
& Otto Cars, Antibacterial Drug Resistance: Options for Concerted Action, in PRIORITY
MEDICINES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD PROJECT: A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO
INNOVATION
(World
Health
Organization,
Feb.
2005),
available
at
http://mednet3.who.int/prioritymeds/report/index.htm.
251. See, e.g., Iain Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry,
23 HEALTH AFF. 10 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (stressing unreplenished pipeline and other causal
factors for past slow down); Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44
(discussing need to pool small molecule libraries for upstream basic research by university
scientists using high-throughput screening technology).
252. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
253. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32. For evidence, see, e.g.,
Jun Ma, Randall S. Stafford, Iain M. Cockburn & Stan N. Finkelstein, A statistical analysis of
the magnitude and composition of drug promotion in the United States in 1998, 25 CLINICAL
THERAPEUTICS 1503-17 (2003).
The researchers analyzed nationally representative data on expenditures for the 250
most promoted medications in the United States in 1998 and the five most
commonly used modes of promotion. During that year, the pharmaceutical industry
spent $12,724 million promoting its products in the United States, of which 86
percent was accounted for by the top 250 drugs and 52 percent by the top 50 drugs.
Direct-to-consumer advertising was more concentrated on a small subset of
medications than was promotion directed to professionals.
Id. Direct consumer advertising alone reportedly cost the pharmaceutical companies $2.6
billion in 2003. See Jennifer Harper, Drug ads provide a mixed blessing; But consumers do go
to doctor, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2004, at A08. Growth in promotion reportedly outstripped
growth in research spending by more than 50 percent. See David Pauly, Drug Companies’
Cost of Pushing Pills Rivals R&D, BLOOMBERG, Aug. 26, 2004.
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cumulative costs of clinical trials, the threshold level of profitability for
new candidate drugs—estimated by some to range between 800 million
254
to one billion dollars—would likely fall by a considerable amount.
This lower threshold could significantly reduce profit requirements that
discourage the introduction and development of new drugs.
The resources drug companies now expend to market and protect
existing drugs from competition could be redeployed to discover new
and potentially more valuable medicines if the state bore some
significant portion of the cost of clinical trials. Given lower testing costs
and lowered risk premiums, firms could expect profits from a much
broader range of products taken to market than at present, and
incentives to discover such products would correspondingly increase in a
255
less lottery-like environment.
Moreover, with public disclosure of previous clinical trial results
concerning related medicines, companies could better predict which
candidate medications should be effective and safe for clinical use. For
example, early disclosure of clinical trial findings that Vioxx posed
greater risks than originally known might have prompted its worldwide
market withdrawal, increased scrutiny of similar drugs, and accelerated
256
R&D to find a better product in the same therapeutic class.
More
private funding for drug research and development might follow as drug
companies improved at predicting clinical success earlier in the drug
approval process.
To this end, a competitive framework for peer-reviewed, federal
grant support of clinical trials could be designed to reward those lines of
investigation that promised major pharmaceutical innovation or that
answered important questions about clinical cost-effectiveness. Where
therapeutic competition is lacking, public funding might lower the
barrier to new entrants without undermining patent rights. In so doing,
this public investment in clinical trials might amplify the benefits of
lower drug prices through enhanced therapeutic competition that could
257
impact existing, not just new, drugs on the market.

254. Accord, Baker, supra note 227, at 14.
255. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 4. See also Grabowski,
Increasing R&D Incentives, supra note 19, at 460-61 (stressing lottery like atmosphere where
most products fail to recoup R&D costs).
256. Matthew Herper, Pfizer’s Vioxx Problem, FORBES, Oct. 15, 2004,
http://www.forbes.com/2004/10/15/cx_mh_1015bextra_print.html.
257. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 4.
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(2) A Secondary Market for Remedial Improvers
Public funding and disclosure of clinical trial results could also
stimulate a secondary collaborative market for finding remedies to
investigational obstacles that thwarted development of promising
medications. Various reasons account for drug company decisions to
shelve products pending approval rather than completing the costly
clinical testing process. Sometimes it is a marketing decision, while at
other times, it is a clinical setback that mandates a new investigational
course. A registry of the drugs failing clinical standards and of the data
yielded by the tests could be made available for improvements by third
258
parties after a suitable period of time.
A company whose drug application had been denied or withdrawn
would have a specified period to seek remedies to the deficiencies
identified at trial, in order to qualify for a new round of testing. If the
originating company failed to meet this requirement, the relevant data
could be relegated to a legally defined semicommons open to would-be
third party improvers. If any of the latter solved the problem and
restored the candidate drug’s chances of FDA approval, that successful
improver could gain the right to market the drug in return for payment
of a reasonable royalty to the originator company in case of commercial
259
success to cover earlier costs of R&D.
A version of this approach
already exists for agricultural chemical test data in the United States.
After a period of exclusivity, follow-on competitors may enter the
marketplace by providing compensation to the originating company that
invested in the line of research to help cover the costs of obtaining
260
public safety data.

258. See supra note 230; Marc J. Scheineson & M. Lynn Sykes, Major New Initiatives
Require Increased Disclosure of Clinical Trial Information, 60 FOOD DRUG L.J. 525,535-540
(2005). But see the discussion of risks in Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information
Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623 (2007).
259. See Reichman, Of Green Tulips, supra note 132. See also Rai et al., Pathways
Across the Valley of Death, supra note 44; Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 202, at 315-440. If
the original failed product were patented, the improver under such a “compensatory liability
regime” would in effect obtain a tailor-made dependent compulsory license (“antiblocking”
license) like those generally available for improvement patents in most developed countries
(but not the United States). On this premise, the originator company might also receive a
cross-license on the patented improvement. Cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 31(l)
(compulsory licenses for dependent patents).
260. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, at §§136a(c)(2)(B). See also Weissman,
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 130, at 157; Fellmeth, supra note 130.
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3. Implementing a Public Testing Program
The government should fund clinical tests to the fullest extent
permitted by sound fiscal policy. The definition of products subject to
this proposal should be broad enough to include drug treatments,
vaccines, medical devices, and diagnostic or monitoring tests. The term
“clinical trials” means Phases I through III as understood in current
261
FDA practice, as well as post-approval Phase IV clinical trials.
a. Awarding Clinical Tests to the Most Qualified Scientists
Nothing in this proposal requires the government to physically
conduct the tests under the aegis of a specialized agency, although this
remains a possibility. One may anticipate that an industry comprised of
the qualified and experienced scientists who have previously conducted
clinical tests for the drug companies would emerge initially to perform
clinical testing under this program. The primary role of the government
would be to oversee competitive awards of testing contracts to worthy
testing organizations—either public or private, but not affiliated with
the drug companies—in accordance with public health priorities.
This approach builds on proven strengths of the federal government
to administer extramural research grants, like those that the NIH
routinely award. As already occurs in that grant-making process,
scientific review panels would identify potential biases in study design,
and, with inputs from the drug regulatory authority, insist on
appropriate treatment comparisons by the designated clinical trial
262
units.
b. Revenue Neutral Financing with Cost Sharing and Social Funding
Criteria
Government funding of clinical tests should be revenue-neutral in

261. Each phase of the clinical trial process is designed to answer distinct research
questions. In Phase I, researchers testing a new drug or treatment in small groups for the first
time seek to evaluate overall safety, determine a safe dose range, and identify side effects.
During Phase II, use by a larger group of subjects focuses on effectiveness, further
evaluations of safety, and finding the right dose. Phase III tests on large groups of people
seek to confirm estimates of effectiveness, monitor side effects, compare the new product to
commonly used treatments, and to collect more information bearing on safe usage. Phase IV
studies are conducted after marketing of the drug or treatment in question to gather
information about its effects on different populations and any side effects associated with
long-term use. See the NIH resource information on clinical trials at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctphases.html.
262. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 3.
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263

principle. Public support of clinical testing could be financed directly
by the reduced drug reimbursements the federal government should pay
264
as the country’s largest employer and provider of health insurance. If
market forces and health insurers’ pressures failed to secure the desired
level of social returns, in the form of lowered drug prices, from the
proposed public investment, additional safeguards could become
necessary. Some combination of moral suasion, compulsory licensing,
or other legal measures to address patent misuse and the larger public
265
interest might then be invoked for this purpose.
Yet, heightened
transparency could make it costly for the drug industry to frustrate the
goals of government funded clinical trials and thus render such
safeguard measures unnecessary in practice. Moreover, even these
measures – if required in extreme cases - appear relatively unobtrusive
against the backdrop of growing demands for the price regulation
266
schemes practiced abroad and for mounting calls for government
267
control of the innovation process.

263. Id. at 4.
264. For details, see Baker, supra note 227.
265. Jerome H. Reichman, Comment: A Trilogy of Views about Compulsory Licensing
of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions, SYMPOSIUM ISSUE, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
(forthcoming 2009); JEROME H. REICHMAN WITH CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NONVOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS,
AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA, ICTSD/UNCTAD Issue
Paper No. 5, Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development Series
(ICTSD/UNCTAD 2002), available at http://ictsd.net/i/publications/11764/ (last visited Jan.
19, 2009).
266. Some observers argue that safeguards embodied in the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
already provide the basis for federally authorized price controls of pharmaceuticals based on
federally funded research results. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)(i)-(iii) (2002) (power of NIH to
restrict patenting of federally funded research results in “exceptional circumstances”); 35
U.S.C. § 203(1)(a), (b) (march-in rights under Bayh-Dole Act of 1980); Peter S. Arno &
Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631
(2001). For the view that the Bayh-Dole Act provisions provide a potentially workable
framework for regulating misuse of patents on federally funded research results, see Jerome
H. Reichman, Testimony Before NIH Public Hearing on March-In Rights Under the BayhDole Act (May 23, 2004). However, others believe that, in their present form, these same
provisions are unworkable without serious administrative reforms. See Arti K. Rai &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003). See generally, Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for
Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078 (Oct. 2008),
available at www.plosbiology.org.
267. See, e.g., Hubbard & Love, supra note 92; Eduardo Porter, Do New Drugs Always
Have to Cost So Much?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at BU5; Dean Baker, Financing Drug
Research: What Are the Issues?, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., Sept. 22, 2004,
http://www.cepr.net/publications/patents_what_are_the_issues_9-20.pdf
(reviewing
four
reform proposals).
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It must be stressed that the drug companies should bear some share
of the costs of conducting clinical trials, irrespective of the government’s
ultimate fiscal capacity. This safeguard is needed to discourage the
wholesale testing of marginal drugs with little therapeutic value or of
candidate medicines with little chance of clinical adoption. A process
that reimbursed a progressively larger share of testing costs for those
medicines that displayed the greatest potential benefits would
encourage companies to select only the most promising medicines for
clinical review at public expense.
Moreover, the bulk of any
reimbursements for Phase I and II trials could be delayed until, and
conditioned on, the success of Phase III trials, with varying
reimbursement formulas depending on the potential public benefits in
case of success.
Any pharmaceutical company that failed to win a sizeable amount of
government funding for any given product could, of course, proceed to
conduct the relevant trials at its own expenses, as at present. Selective
funding of clinical trials would thus afford the government some
discretion in supporting the development of drugs with greatest
potential social value that might otherwise be overlooked under a
268
totally market-driven approach.
An important factor in any such
selection process would be the overall public health impact of the
candidate drug. This factor would be measured by the relative burden
of the underlying disease, by the availability of existing clinical options
to treat it, by the need to stimulate greater competition within a given
therapeutic class, and by the need to treat certain neglected diseases,
including both rare or orphan diseases, by means that might otherwise
not be developed absent government assistance.
c. Phased Implementation
Transforming clinical trials from an excluded private good to a nonexcluded public good is an ambitious undertaking, one that would
require gradual implementation. The first step would be to decouple
drug company sponsorship from the management of clinical trials, by
requiring the federal government to oversee the trials and dissemination
of results under the aegis of a national testing program.
Second, the program would conduct pilot projects targeting drug
candidates that promised the greatest social benefit from public testing.
Drugs that offered innovative therapeutic benefits, or significant gains
over existing treatments, would receive a preferred status. As the
268. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32, at 3.
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program grew, public testing would expand to drugs that offered
therapeutic alternatives in treatment areas where there were none.
Finally, after a set period, the pilot projects would be evaluated to
identify the costs and benefits of public testing and dissemination for
chosen drug groups, and to indicate other drug groups the program
269
might include.
Over time, however, the more fully that the federal
government was able to absorb the aggregate costs of the clinical testing
process, the greater would be the benefits along the drug supply chain as
a whole.
d. Globalization of the Public Good Concept
By focusing attention on the public good nature of clinical trial data,
the foregoing discussion necessarily locates the drive for data exclusivity
within the larger context of clarifying the role of global public goods in
an integrated world market for freely traded private goods and services.
Here, we encounter mounting tensions between measures to stimulate
an “incipient transnational system of innovation” through trade-related
intellectual property rights and long-established governmental
obligations to provide such public goods as health, education, food
security, scientific research, environmental safety, and a well270
functioning competitive economy.
Increasingly, these tensions arise because privatized knowledge
goods protected by international intellectual property rights function as
inputs into domestic public goods, which inputs, if unregulated, may
lead to high prices in poor countries and rising levels of deadweight
271
loss. While adversely affected developing countries struggle to resolve
269. Id. at 3-4.
270. See, e.g., Maskus & Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods,
supra note 97; J. H. Reichman, Richard Lillith Memorial Lecture, Nurturing a Transnational
System of Innovation, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL. 143 (2007); Peter Drahos, The Regulation
of Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 46-54 (Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006).
271. See, e.g., Okediji, INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 101, at 142-87;
Robert E. Evenson, Agricultural Research and Intellectual Property Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 188-246 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H.
Reichman eds., 2005); Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property Protection and
Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME 726-57 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Richard Nelson,
Linkages Between the Market Economy and the Scientific Commons, in INTERNATIONAL
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these tensions by resorting to the so-called “flexibilities” within the
272
TRIPS Agreement itself, developed countries that count on rents from
knowledge goods qua tradable assets press them to forego these
273
flexibilities in the name of “respecting IPRs.”
Gradually, the
technology exporting countries have whittled down these flexibilities
through TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral and regional Free Trade
274
Agreements.
The drive to augment the protection of privately generated clinical
trial data at the international level fits logically within this conceptual
framework and exemplifies the relative indifference to distributional
effects that often accompanies efforts to elevate international
intellectual property standards without seating those who represent the
275
public interest at the table. With specific regard to clinical trial data,
however, these tensions between private and public goods seem easier
to resolve than in many other cases.
As a relative newcomer to the international stage, the status of data
exclusivity in intellectual property law remains unsettled and relatively
unstable, as witnessed by its collocation under the rubric of unfair
276
competition law within Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement itself. If
the treatment of clinical trial data as a private good in developed
countries represents a fundamentally flawed concept, a resolute reform
that recognized such data as a public good in the developed world could
itself constitute a platform for rapid recognition of this same subject
277
matter as a global public good.
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME 121-38 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Abbott &
Reichman, supra note 59.
272. See, e.g., ICTSD/UNCTAD RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 103 (examining
flexibilities in detail); HUGENHOLZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 101.
273. See, for example, the United States’ response to the grants of compulsory licenses
on pharmaceuticals by Thailand and Brazil, as discussed in Abbott & Reichman, supra note
59, at 980.
274. See, e.g., Mercurio, supra note 98, at 215-38; Okediji, supra note 93. See also
Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 91.
275. Peter M. Gerhart, Distributive Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of
Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFERS OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 69-78 (Keith E.
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). See also Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike
Palmedo, An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in
Developing Countries, J.L. MED. & ETHICS (forthcoming 2009); Jerome H. Reichman, The
TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441 (2000).
276. See Taubman, supra note 30; supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
277. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge As a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC
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Once policymakers began to view clinical trials from that angle,
rather than as a private-sector obligation whose results and outcomes
278
must be rendered artificially scarce,
they could find dazzling
opportunities to restructure the conduct and delivery of clinical trials on
an efficient worldwide basis. For example, transnational testing
agencies, perhaps governed by the World Health Organization
(“WHO”), could achieve additional economies of scale and scope,
which would drive the costs progressively lower for all participating
countries. Transparency with regard to outcomes would then serve to
advance medical research everywhere and could stimulate targeted
development aid for public-private partnerships seeking to make
279
essential drugs more affordable. State subsidies of clinical trials, and
the resulting reductions in the price of drugs that would ensue, could
take some of the pressure off growing tendencies to invoke compulsory
280
licenses in poor countries and lead to enhanced public-private
cooperation with regard to both drugs emanating from developed
countries and drugs needed for diseases that occur predominantly in
281
developing countries.
If clinical trials were treated as a global public good, however, it
would remain necessary for governments around the world who
participated in such a scheme to contribute a fair share to the aggregate
costs of conducting such clinical trials, adjusted for relative capacities to
pay and for per capita gross domestic product (“GDP”). Otherwise, any
perceived free-rider problem would simply shift from the private to the
public sector, without additional relief for taxpayers in the developed
countries.
In this connection, the elegant “fairness” calculations recently
devised by Professor Fellmeth would seem particularly relevant and

ST

GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21 CENTURY 308 (Inge Kaul et al. eds.,
1999). See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 8.1.
278. Lewis, et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32.
279. LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POL. SCI., WELLCOME TRUST, THE NEW LANDSCAPE
OF NEGLECTED DISEASE DRUG DEVELOPMENT 26-35 (Sept. 2005).
280. See, e.g., Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59. See also Klaus Stegemann,
International Price Discrimination and Market Segmentation for Patented Pharmaceuticals in
the EU: A Social Welfare Analysis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 145-59 (Inge Govaere & Hanns Ullrich eds., 2007).
281. See, e.g., Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi), New, Once-a-Day
Fixed-Dose Combination Against Malaria Now Available (March 1, 2007), available at
htpp://www.dndi.org; Jean-René Kiechel & Bernard Pecoul, Innovative Partnership Brings
New ACT Free of Patent, Guest Blog, PLOS June 22, 2008, http://www.plos.org/cms/node/208.
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worthy of careful scrutiny. Fellmeth analyzes several different models,
including a “Simple Divisions Royalties Model” and a more
sophisticated “Readjustable Royalties Model,” which takes into account
such factors as the initial costs of R&D, the time value of money, the
number of participants in the scheme, and their ability to pay. Because
his calculus, as it stands, is based entirely on private rights, it would have
to be recast and transposed to a public sector framework that also took
account of private inputs. Thought must also be given to a global
regulatory framework that, at a minimum, should oversee the collection
and distribution of payments by governments in exchange for access to
283
clinical trial results developed anywhere under the scheme.
This
fascinating topic awaits future research and another article.
Nevertheless, if governments funded the bulk of clinical trials (in
addition to current high levels of funding for basic research in
developed countries), the heightened transparency pervading the supply
chain should oblige originator pharmaceutical companies to lower prices
everywhere to more accurately reflect their actual costs of production,
284
their private R&D expenditures, and their marketing costs.
If,
instead, these companies—liberated to a large extent from the yoke of
clinical trial costs—resisted pressures to reduce the prices of medicines
in proportion to the public benefits received, while still earning
revenues sufficient to cover costs and provide a competitive return on
investment, that same transparency would expose them to liability for
compulsory licensing and other legal measures available to address
patent abuse and the larger public interest, as expressly envisioned by
285
the TRIPS Agreement itself. It would also encourage demands for the
price regulation schemes practiced in Canada and other developed
286
countries and for greater government control of the innovation
287
process as distinct from marketing concerns.

282. See Fellmeth, supra note 130, at 478-500.
283. See PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBALIZATION (Inge
Kaul et al. eds., 2003); Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory
Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387 (2000).
284. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding, supra note 32.
285. See, e.g., Abbott & Reichman, supra note 59; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29,
arts. 8.1, 8.2, 31, 40.
286. REICHMAN WITH HASENZAHL, supra note 153; OECD Study (2008), supra note
151, available at http://www.oecd.org.
287. See, e.g., Hubbard & Love, supra note 92; World Health Organization, Agenda
item 11.6, Global Strategy and Plan of Action in Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Property (May 24, 2008).
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CONCLUSION
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members to
protect the secret clinical trial data that foreign pharmaceutical
companies submit for regulatory approval of new chemical entities
288
against “disclosure” and “unfair commercial use.” This provision does
not prevent governments from authorizing the generic manufacture of
bioequivalent products on the basis of foreign regulatory approvals and
the relevant scientific literature. Nevertheless, governments must treat
deposits of clinical test data by originator pharmaceutical companies as
trade secrets and guard against their misappropriation by employees or
289
third parties.
The freedom to authorize production of bioequivalent generic drugs
that developing countries possess under Article 39.3 of TRIPS, as it
stands, has been shrinking rapidly under pressures from TRIPS-plus
provisions concerning clinical test data inserted into bilateral and
290
regional Free Trade Agreements. These FTAs tend to provide a de
facto sui generis exclusive property right on the originator companies’
test data, irrespective of any patent rights they may or may not hold.
Moreover, the FTAs’ data exclusivity regimes have grown more
stringent over time, and once implemented into domestic laws, they can
delay local generic producers’ entry into developing country markets
291
even where no patents exist for periods of five to fifteen years. FTA
provisions on data exclusivity can also undermine other important
flexibilities set out in the TRIPS Agreement, including the broad rights
of WTO Members to impose compulsory licenses on patented
pharmaceuticals under Article 31. In this and other respects, such FTA
provisions conflict with the spirit of the Doha Ministerial Declaration on
292
TRIPS and Public Health.
Developing countries that have not yet committed to FTAs should
remain wary of undervaluing the social costs of their intellectual
property chapters, especially because any concessions made to the
trading partner must be extended to all other WTO Members under the
293
broad MFN clause set out in Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Developing countries should particularly resist obligations that would
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 74-89.
See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 105-15.
See supra note 57; supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 4.
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limit regulatory approval of generic pharmaceuticals under Article 39.3,
as it stands, and they should reject the data exclusivity framework that
has emerged from recent United States FTAs with Latin American
countries, among others. If some form of compromise on the issue of
clinical test data becomes unavoidable, developing country negotiators
should stand firm on cost-sharing counter-proposals that would at least
294
avoid barriers to entry for generic producers.
Attempts to justify the protection of clinical trial data as a separate
and distinct subject matter of intellectual property law on the grounds of
an incentive rationale, coupled with fairness considerations, appear
dubious in the light of systematic legal and economic analysis. Although
the costs of clinical trials have soared and may become unsustainable
295
over time, originator pharmaceutical companies have benefited from
comparatively strong patent protection and the power it gives to charge
high prices to consumers in both developed and developing countries,
largely because they must recoup these costs.
Moreover, government funding of basic medical research is so
extensive in the United States at least that, in most cases, the
downstream R&D costs of clinical trials are the main burden that
originator companies bear, in addition to medicinal chemistry and
marketing expenditures. Given the strong patents that already support
medical research results, the case for an additional revenue stream from
a data exclusivity right sounding in an incentive rationale looks like
special pleading. To the extent that clinical test data protection may
occasionally apply when patents were otherwise unavailable for various
reasons, this justification would not support the logic of a patent-like
exclusive property regime. At most, in view of soaring clinical costs, a
“compensatory liability regime” might be envisioned in appropriately
296
circumscribed factual situations.
Such a regime could oblige
competitors to share the costs of clinical trials for a specified period of
time.
Even these fall back considerations should not normally apply to
generic producers in developing countries who obtain regulatory
approval from their governments by showing bioequivalence with drugs
approved abroad, while otherwise meeting local health and safety
requirements. If the drugs in question were patented in these
developing countries, local marketing approval would not entitle
294. See supra text accompanying notes 134-54.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
296. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
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competitors to infringe the foreign patentees’ exclusive rights to make,
297
use, and sell the patented products. If, instead, no patents applied to
the product in question, it is never “unfair” to reverse-engineer products
that are not covered by territorial patents, so long as the second comer
does not misappropriate trade secrets and adopts distinctive trademarks
298
of its own that avoid confusion or deception of consumers.
As matters stand, the originator pharmaceutical companies recoup
the bulk of their R&D costs in the developed countries. The marketing
of these products in developing countries, whether patented or not,
should in principle proceed on a “high-volume, low profit margin”
approach, and not on a “high profit-low volume” approach as usually
299
occurs today. Adding a backdoor exclusive property right in clinical
test data to the originator companies’ legal arsenal only postpones
needed price discrimination policies and further distorts the worldwide
300
market for essential medicines.
However, these reflections on abusive uses of intellectual property
rights in poor countries should not obscure the fact that soaring costs of
clinical trials pose a major problem for global public health. It should,
instead, suggest that our whole way of thinking about the problems of
regulatory approval for new pharmaceutical products needs to change.
It is time to recognize that the conduct of clinical trials is a
quintessential public good whose costs should be collectively defrayed
by governments and whose results should be made universally available
under the sharing norms of science.
In the long run, if developed countries were persuaded to treat
clinical trials of new pharmaceutical products as public goods in their
domestic laws, the developing countries should favorably respond to
proposals to treat them collectively as a global public good. In that
event, the latter’s willingness to support the costs of such trials wherever
conducted, on a capacity to pay basis, would counter current pressures
297. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, arts. 27-28.
298. Paris Convention, supra note 71, art. 4bis (independence of patents), 10bis (unfair
competition norms). See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (Sears-Compco Doctrine); Wal-Mart
Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
299. See MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH & NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY OFFICE
THAILAND, FACTS AND EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE
GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND
(Feb. 2007), available at http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20Paper%20CL-EN.pdf; Abbott
& Reichman, supra note 59. For the economic logic that impels originator companies to
charge high prices in poor countries, see Flynn, Hollis, & Palmedo, supra note 275.
300. See, e.g., Outterson, supra note 136.
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for both secrecy and exclusive property rights, while helping to make
clinical trial results available worldwide for follow-on R&D. It would
also lead to economies of scale and scope that should reduce the costs of
clinical trials worldwide. Above all, collective government funding
could exert a powerful downward pressure on the prices of medicines,
which currently express high risk premiums to cover the soaring costs of
privately funded clinical trials in developed countries.
Global public health could be further enhanced if the results of
failed clinical testing became available for improvements under the
301
liability rules discussed above. Rather than just shelving products with
negative results or high risk premiums, resort to a non-exclusive
licensing mechanism could enable companies everywhere to build on
cumulative and sequential innovation in the pharmaceutical sector,
while sharing both the costs of R&D and ultimate profits with first
movers who had not altogether resolved problems of toxicity and safe
delivery.
To the extent that funding for clinical trials of new pharmaceutical
products became a global public sector responsibility, it would yield at
least three additional benefits. First, by sharing clinical trial data under
the open access norms of science, the costs of redundant investigations
would be squeezed out of the global public health system. Second,
instead of further elevating the prices of existing pharmaceuticals in
developing countries by means of a pseudo-intellectual property right in
clinical test data, a global funding system based on equitable
contributions to the overall costs of conducting such tests would lower
supply costs and make both patented and unpatented medicines
universally more affordable.
Finally, as the private sector’s costs of certifying candidate drugs for
marketing approval went down, the breakeven point for investment in
research to discover new drugs should correspondingly drop, with a
progressive lowering of barriers to entry around the world. These
phenomena would then intensify the incentive effects of existing
international standards of intellectual property protection under the
TRIPS Agreement and make it more feasible for small and mediumsized firms everywhere to compete in the global pharmaceutical market
on the basis of research-driven drug discovery.

301. See supra text accompanying notes 258-60.

